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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

MOROCCAN ENVOY TO LIBYA PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

LD070447 Tripoli JANA in English 1716 GMT 6 Aug 81

[Text] Tripoli, 6 Aug (JANA)--'Abd al-Ati al-Ubaydi, secretary of the People's Committee of the Foreign Liaison Bureau, this morning received Maati Jorio who presented his credentials as Morocco's new ambassador to Jamahiriyah.

Mr Jorio delivered a speech expressing Morocco's sincere desire in working to consolidate relations between the two brotherly peoples in the Arab nation's interests and to develop ideal relations which would realize our nation's aims to thwart the conspiracies facing it.

He stressed, "the marginal differences between Arab countries disappear in the face of the blatant challenges confronting the Arab nation and its existence and civilization."

He stressed the necessity "for unifying Arab endeavours and energies in deploying them against the Arab nation's common enemy."

Referring to the mutual and sincere desire to consolidate bilateral relations, he said, "this will give us powerful impetus to deploy all our abilities in implementing this nationalist aim."

Al-Ubaydi responded by stressing the Libyan Arab people's readiness to strengthen relations with its brotherly Moroccan people. He said, "the leader's nationalist proposals, during the celebrations of the 11th anniversary of the American forces' evacuation, affirms this orientation."

He added "the Libyan Arab Brotherhood Bureau in Rabat will concentrate its efforts to consolidate these relations, develop them and advance them to realize the two brotherly people's ambitions. The Moroccan Embassy in Jamahiriyah will find all support and assistance to fulfill its role in strengthening bilateral relations."

He then provided the Moroccan ambassador with detailed explanations about direct democracy practiced in Jamahiriyah and the new organization of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and its role in strengthening the Libyan Arab people's relations with other peoples.

CSO: 4500/33

ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION OF POLICE WARRANT OFFICERS INSTITUTE

Cairo AL-WAQA'I AL-MISRIYAH [THE EGYPTIAN MINUTES: SUPPLEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 125, 28 May 81 pp 3-27

[Ministry of Interior Decree Organizing Police Warrant Officers Institute]

[Text] Ministry of Interior Decree No 534 of 1981 Concerning Bylaws of Police Warrant Officers Institute:

The minister of interior,

After perusing law No 109 of 1971 concerning the police authority;

Ministerial decree No 196 of 1967 organizing the Training Agency;

Ministerial decree No 133 of 1968 on the regulations of the educational institutes of the Training Agency;

Ministerial decree No 1925 of 1969 establishing and organizing the Police Warrant Officers Institute;

Ministerial decree No 1527 of 1971 establishing and organizing the General and Specialized Training Center, of the Warrant Police Officers;

Ministerial decree No 1477 of 1980 reorganizing the General Personnel Affairs Department;

The memorandum of the first assistant minister of planning, followup and control, approved on 16 October 1980, on studying the issue of personnel and drawing practical solutions for it;

The memorandum of the General Organization and Administration Department, dated 8 March 1981;

And the approval of the Higher Police Council;

And in accordance with the State Council's opinion,

Has decreed:

Article 1: The General and Specialized Training Center of the Police Warrant Officers shall be merged with the Police Warrant Officers Institute and shall come under the direct control of the Training Agency director.

Article 2: The Police Warrant Officers Institute shall be headed by a commander who shall be in charge of managing and disposing of the institute's affairs in the various educational, military, disciplinary, athletic and administrative spheres in the manner outlined in detail in the attached bylaws.

Article 3: The rules contained in the attached bylaws shall apply to the Police Warrant Officers Institute.

In matters for which no rule is found in the attached bylaws, the regulations of the Training Agency Educational Institutes shall be applied.

Article 4: This decree shall be published in AL-WAQA'I AL-MISRIYAH and shall go into force on the day following its publication.

Issued on 16 March 1981.

Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il

Bylaws of Police Warrant Officers Institute

Article 1: The Police Warrant Officers Institute shall provide the police warrant officers with theoretical and applied education and training so that they may work in the various police agencies and shall prepare them for promotion to higher ranks.

The institute shall consist of the two following sections:

1. The general section which shall include the initial educational phase and the phase of specialized training.
2. The section providing training for promotion.

Article 2: The institute shall be headed by a commander with the proper rank who will be under the direct authority of the Training Agency director. He shall be assisted by a second commander with a lower rank for each of the two sections. Upon the commander's absence, the more senior of the two second commanders shall replace him.

The commander shall also be assisted by aides for the following tasks:

- A. Educational affairs.
- B. Training affairs.
- C. Student affairs.
- D. Administrative and financial affairs.

Chapter One

Rules Governing Acceptance, Enrollment and Registration at Institute

Article 3: The minister of Interior, or whomever he delegates, shall set the number of students to be accepted at the institute each year in accordance with a recommendation submitted by the General Personnel Affairs Department at an adequate time before the date set for the start of studies and after consultation with the Higher Police Council.

The Training Agency director shall set the acceptance, enrollment and registration regulations, shall determine their dates and conditions and shall advertise them at least two weeks before the date set for the acceptance of enrollment applications.

Article 4: An applicant wishing to enroll in the initial phase [general section] of the institute shall be required to meet the following conditions:

1. Be an Egyptian citizen. Should he lose his citizenship while studying at the institute, he shall be dismissed.
2. Be of good conduct and reputation.
3. Not sentenced previously to a criminal penalty or to a penalty restricting freedom as a result of a crime violating honor or a trust.
4. Not dismissed previously from government service by a sentence or by a final disciplinary decision, unless at least four years have passed since issuance of the sentence.
5. Not dismissed previously on a disciplinary measure from any other institute or school because of misconduct.
6. Have a general secondary education certificate or its equivalent in the skilled specializations determined by the minister of interior on the recommendation of the Training Agency director.
7. Be physically fit to receive education and training. Should the student become physically unfit while studying, he shall be considered dismissed from the institute. Loss of physical fitness shall be determined by the medical authority concerned.
8. His age upon the start of studies shall not exceed 26 years.
9. He shall not be shorter than 167 centimeters, with a chest span of 84 centimeters at least.
10. Shall not be conscripted in the armed forces, unless he acquires their approval to enroll in the institute.
11. The student and his guardian or guarantor shall undertake in writing a consolidated commitment to repay the total sum of monies spent on the student and monies he collects [in salary] during his studies in case he resigns.

Article 5: The applicant must pass the physical and health fitness test in accordance with the conditions set by the Training Agency director.

Article 6: A committee to select new students in the institute shall be formed of:

The assistant minister of interior concerned as chairman.

The Training Agency director as member.

The director of the General Personnel Affairs Department as member.

The institute commander as member.

The second commander of the institute's general section as member.

Upon the absence of the committee chairman or one of its members, whoever performs the work duties of the absentee shall replace him [on the committee].

The selection committee shall issue its decisions by absolute majority. The decisions shall not be final until approved by the minister of interior.

Article 7: This committee shall select the students from among those who have acquired certificates meeting the needs of the authorities concerned in accordance with the plan drawn up for the academic year in which the students are accepted. In making its selection, the committee shall take into consideration:

The grade total, the newness of the educational qualification and the right age.

Article 8: No more than 15 percent of the total number of those whom it is decided to accept at the institute shall be exempted from the conditions stated in provisions 8 and 9 of article 4 and from the physical fitness condition referred to in article 5, provided that their age not exceed 28 years at the start of schooling. The exempted shall be from among the following categories:

1. The sons or brothers of persons martyred in defense of the country or the sons or brothers of policemen who have died during or because of the service.
2. The sons and brothers of persons lost in military operations.
3. The sons of present and former police and armed forces officers.
4. The sons of present and former civil servants in the Ministry of Interior.
5. The sons of present and former members of the police organization.
6. Persons excelling athletically, provided that they submit certificates authenticated by the sports unions concerned.

Article 9: The Selection Committee's decision shall be published at the institute premises, at the Training Agency and at the Security Directorates Bureau.

An applicant whom it has been decided to accept at the institute shall present himself for enrollment within three weeks of the announcement of the committee decision.

Should the applicant fail to present himself on time, he shall be considered dismissed, unless he presents an excuse which the institute administration finds acceptable.

Article 10: The new students shall spend a three-month probation period to make sure of their moral, educational and disciplinary fitness to join the police corps.

If the student completes the probation period successfully, his name shall be registered as one of the institute's students. Any student who fails to complete the probation period successfully shall be dismissed from the institute on a decision by the Selection Committee explaining the reasons. This decision shall not become final until approved by the minister of interior.

Chapter Two

System of Study and Training at Institute

Article 11: The state shall shoulder the expenses of education, training, residence, food and the cost of training and (holiday) clothes for the students during their period of study at the institute's sections.

Article 12: A monthly recompense of 10 pounds shall be disbursed to the students during the period of their education in the first phase and during their vacation between the two phases.

Article 13: Studies in all sections of the institute shall be conducted in Arabic, in addition to teaching one or more foreign languages in accordance with the curricula on which a decision shall be issued by the Training Agency director.

The Training Agency director shall set the dates for the start and finish of the studies and the dates for the institute's annual examinations.

Article 14: Studies and training in the institute's general section shall consist of two stages:

First stage: Its duration shall be one academic year during which the students study the program prepared by the Training Agency. At the end of the year, a graduation examination shall be held and shall be followed by a vacation, with paid recompense, of no more than two months.

Second stage: Its duration shall be one academic year. At the beginning of this stage, students who complete the first stage successfully shall be appointed with the rank of warrant police officer, third class, on probation. In light of an ability test prepared for the graduates by the Training Agency in coordination with the ministry's authorities concerned, the graduates shall be distributed among the specializing groups [courses] in which the students receive disciplinary, police and specialized training.

Studies in this phase shall include:

First, General Training:

This includes general lectures for all students in various specializations in the following branches:

1. The police studies group [course]:

Police management and organization.

Police operations, advanced program.

Personnel and documentary security.

2. Criminal and social sciences group [course]:

The art of dealing with the masses.

Criminology.

Sociology.

Psychology.

3. The assisting studies group [course]:

A foreign language.

Spiritual and religious values.

Public symposiums.

4. Practical training, such as military and athletic training, advanced target shooting and typing--all in accordance with a program that is compatible with the students and that realizes the desired goal of training.

Other studies may be added, should the need arise, on a decision by the Training Agency director upon the recommendation of the institute administration or upon a request by one of the authorities concerned.

Second, Specialization Groups [courses]:

These include:

A. The secretarial specialization group which includes the police warrant officers who will specialize in office, administrative and financial activities, in filing, listing and other secretarial arts, in addition to typing.

B. The technical specializations group which includes warrant officers specializing in works requiring technical or scientific skills, such as radio, computers, vehicles, criminal evidence, firefighting and other specialization.

C. The public security specializations group which includes the warrant officers who will specialize in the various spheres of police action, such as (assistant duty officers) and patrol, traffic, port security officers and other duties.

D. The investigation specializations group which includes the warrant officers who are trained to work in the various fields of investigation.

Article 15: The police warrant officers may not assume their duties or be dispatched to the authorities in whose fields they have specialized before passing the examination of the second phase successfully.

Article 16: The warrant police officers nominated for promotion to higher ranks shall join the institute's section for promotion training to take training courses that seek to raise their capability and their awareness of their duties and to enhance their military discipline.

The active veteran warrant officers nominated to work in the ministry's various specialized fields may also join the specialized groups to enhance their ability in these fields.

In coordination with the:

The General Personnel Affairs Department,

And the General Organization and Administration Department,

The Training Agency director shall set the number of students in each course, the number and duration of the courses, the dates of their convocation and the subjects to be taught in them.

Article 17: The resignation of a student in the initial phase shall not be considered final without the approval of his guardian or guarantor and the ratification of the Training Agency director. In case the resignation is accepted, the student shall be made to repay the total sum spent on him and the recompense he collected during his period of study at the institute jointly with his guardian or guarantor and without undermining any administrative penalty imposed on him. The provisions of law No 109 of 1971 concerning the police authority shall be applied to students of the second phase or students in the section for promotion training [in case they submit their resignation].

Article 18: In case the student's resignation is accepted, the institute administration shall notify the conscription zone within whose jurisdiction the institute falls to deal with the resignee insofar as his conscription is concerned while taking into consideration the stipulations of the police authority law in this regard.

Article 19: A student may not absent himself from the institute, unless for a compulsory reason. Should he absent himself, he or his guardian shall notify the institute of the reasons compelling him to be absent. The institute administration shall assess the reasons. If the excuse is sickness, then the student must proceed to the institute for treatment. If this is impossible, then he must proceed to the nearest public hospital. The student or his guardian shall notify the institute of his admission to the said hospital. Else, the student shall be considered

unjustifiably absent and the institute shall take the necessary measures against him, unless the reasons for his absence are approved by the medical authority concerned and by the institute administration.

Article 20: If the total number of days in which the student is absent from his studies for any reasons exceeds 20 percent of the total actual school days, then he shall be denied participation in the first examination of the phase during which he has been absent. If his absence exceeds 50 percent of the actual school days, he shall be considered a repeater and shall be required to repeat the studies of that phase. His repeating shall be considered tantamount to wasting a chance for passing, unless the absence is due to sickness.

Article 21: The institute administration may grant the student, in emergency situations, a leave of no more than 72 hours at one time for the central area [meaning the area in which the institute is located]. Travel leave may be added to this period, depending on the circumstances of each case separately.

Article 22: A student at the institute shall pay a sum of 150 piasters monthly in return for the health insurance and the social, cultural and athletic activities at the institute.

The sum paid for a student's treatment outside the institute hospital may not exceed 20 pounds for each phase. Should the cost of the treatment exceed this sum, the student shall be treated in public hospitals or at his own expense.

A committee headed by the institute commander shall be formed to adopt the measures and to set the rules governing disbursements for such activities [treatment costs] and the justifications for these disbursements.

Chapter Three

Examination System

Article 23: An examination shall be held at the conclusion of the first phase in accordance with the conditions set by the Training Agency director in coordination with the institute director. The minister of interior shall approve the outcome of the examination and students passing the examination shall be awarded the Police Warrant Officers Institute's diploma.

Article 24: The institute commander shall approve the result of the specialized second phase examination and shall award the students completing this phase successfully a certificate attesting to their completion of the specialized studies.

Article 25: If a student fails to perform all or part of the examination for the two phases for a reason which the institute administration decides to accept, then he may take the second [make-up] examination only in the subjects which he had failed to take.

If the student passes the second [make-up] examination, he shall be credited with the grades he has scored for every subject.

The institute commander shall set the date and rules for the second [make-up] examination so that it may be held no more than one month after announcement of the results of the first examination.

Article 26: Should a student fail one or more subjects in the first phase, he shall be given a second examination only in the subjects he has failed. Should he pass the second [make-up] examination, he shall only be granted the lower end of the grades he scores.

Article 27: If a student in the first phase fails the make-up examination or fails to take this examination for any reason, he shall be considered a repeated and shall be denied one-half his monthly recompense, unless his failure to take the examination is due to a reason acceptable to the administration, in which case he shall not be denied one-half the recompense. If he repeats a second time, he may be dismissed from the institute or given a chance for a third time, but only on a decision by the assistant minister concerned and he shall be denied all or part of the monthly recompense.

Article 28: If a student fails one or more subjects in the second phase examination, he shall be given a make-up examination. If he fails in the make-up examination, he shall be referred to the military court for consideration.

Article 29: Any institute student who cheats or initiates an act of cheating in the examination shall be referred to the military court for consideration.

If the student is caught red-handed, he shall be expelled from the examination hall and shall be prohibited from sitting for the examination for the remaining subjects. This shall be done without violating the possibility of submitting the case for disciplinary action.

Article 30: The top students in the various specializations shall be awarded material and moral incentives on the recommendation of the commander of the Warrant Officers Institute.

Chapter Four

Student Discipline

Article 31: In addition to the rules spelled out in these bylaws, the institute students shall be subject to the directives and instructions issued by the institute administration, without violating the provisions of law No 109 of 1971 concerning the police authority.

The institute commander shall send an efficiency report on each second-phase student to the authority which the student will join after graduation.

Article 32: The disciplinary penalties that may be imposed on the students are:

1. Reprimand in private or in front of the students.
2. Additional services [chores], provided that they do not exceed five services monthly.

3. Additional exercises [al-tawabir], provided that they do not exceed three exercises at one time.

4. Delaying departure from the institute until the morning of official vacations and holidays.

5. Detention at institute during official vacations and holidays. One-fourth a grade shall be deducted for every week of this kind of penalty, beginning with the second week.

6. Deduction from the attendance and conduct grades to a maximum of two grades at one time.

7. Deduction from the recompense, not to exceed the recompense of two days at one time and provided that the total deduction from first-phase students doesn't exceed the recompense of 15 days per entire academic year.

8. Stripping away honor ranks given to veteran students or students excelling in any field or demotion to a lower rank.

9. Solitary confinement for a period of no more than 14 consecutive days.

One-half a conduct grade shall be deducted for each day of this kind of penalty.

10. Cancellation of a student's examination in one or more subjects.

11. Denial of one of the two [first and make-up] examinations or both examinations and considering this denial the using of a chance to pass.

12. Final dismissal from the institute for first-phase students.

Article 33: The following authorities shall be empowered to impose the penalties:

Platoon commanders and officers up to the rank of captain: [Empowered to impose] the penalties stipulated in provisions 1-4.

Company commanders and officers up to the rank of lieutenant colonel: Penalties stipulated in provisions 1-5, provided that the detention does not exceed one week at a time.

Battalion commanders and officers up to the rank of colonel: The penalties stipulated in provisions 1-5, provided that the detention doesn't exceed two weeks at a time.

Commander's aides: The penalties stipulated in provisions 1-6, provided that the detention doesn't exceed two weeks at a time.

Institute's second commander: The penalties stipulated in provisions 1-8. As for the penalty stipulated in provision 9, namely the penalty of solitary confinement, the second commander may impose it for a period of no more than 196 hours at a time.

Institute commander: Provisions 1-9.

Military court: All provisions.

A high-ranking officer (delegated to work at the institute) may impose the penalty of solitary confinement for a period of no more than 24 hours, in addition to the other penalties to which he is empowered by his rank or his original duty.

Article 34: Any first-phase student who stays away from studies at the institute without permission or legal justification shall not be entitled to the recompense for the days he misses.

Article 35: The decisions on disciplinary penalties shall be final. The sentences issued by the military court shall not become final unless approved by the Training Agency director within 15 days of the date on which the papers are presented to him. If this period passes without ratification, cancellation or mitigation of the sentence, then the sentence shall be considered final.

The Training Agency director shall be entitled to mitigate or abolish the penalty and his decision in this regard shall be final.

The minister of interior shall be empowered to mitigate or abolish the disciplinary penalties and the penalties imposed by a sentence from the military court after they are ratified [by the Training Agency director].

Article 36: The order issued for a disciplinary penalty or the sentence of the military court may be suspended if justification for such a suspension is found in the student's conduct, his past or in the circumstances under which he committed the offense for which he is punished.

The suspension may also include the subsequent measures.

The order to suspend implementation of the disciplinary penalty shall be abolished if the student is punished with a similar or a lesser penalty before the lapse of one full month on the imposition of the suspended disciplinary penalty.

Article 37: The institute's military court shall be formed:

Under the chairmanship of the institute's second commander;

And with the institute's two most senior officers, appointed by the institute commander annually, as original members and the two second most senior officers as reserve members.

The court secretary shall be an officer appointed by the institute commander.

If there is any reason to prevent the institute's second commander from heading the court, he shall be replaced by the second most senior officer in the institute.

Referral to the military court shall be on a decision by the institute commander and the trial procedures shall be subject to the provisions of the martial rules law.

Article 38: The student must be notified of the decision to refer him to the military court and of the date of the trial at least 48 hours before it starts.

The student shall be notified in writing at the institute or at his actual place of residence of the trial decision and of the charges against him.

Should the student fail to appear before the court without excuse despite being notified of the referral decision or if he produces an excuse unacceptable to the court, then the court may try him in absentia.

But if the student fails to appear for an excuse acceptable to the court, the trial shall be postponed to another date of which the student is notified in the manner described in the first paragraph of this article.

Article 39: If the student commits an act necessitating his punishment after taking the examination or during the holiday between the two phases conduct marks shall be deducted, regardless of whether the penalty is original or subsequent, from the total grades of the first school phase. His position shall then be determined in light of the subsequent results.

Article 40: If a student absents himself from the institute without permission, one mark shall be deducted from the attendance grades for each of the first 10 days and one-quarter mark for each subsequent day, unless another penalty is imposed on him for this absence.

Chapter Five

Institute's Sections and Administration

Article 41: The institute shall consist of the following sections and units:

- A. The educational affairs section.
- B. The training section.
- C. The students affairs section.
- D. The administrative and financial affairs section.
- E. The technical research unit.
- F. The [public] relations unit.

Article 42: The institute commander, with the aid of the Education Council, shall supervise all sections of the institute and shall supervise directly the technical research unit and the relations unit.

Article 43: The institute commander shall have the following powers:

Draw up the institute's work policy and coordinate its various sections and units.

Nominate teachers and instructors, draw up a plan to train them and observe the implementation of this plan, set the rules for evaluating them and follow up on the evaluation results.

Observe the holding of examinations and follow their procedures through the final phases.

Establish permanent directives to organize the institute's work.

Review the inspection reports concerning the institute to remedy any shortcomings revealed by the inspection and implement any recommendations approved by the Training Agency.

Prepare proposals to reorganize the institute, to modify the tasks of its various sections and units and to develop its curricula and its training methods.

Prepare the annual report on the institute's work and present it to the Training Agency.

Article 44: The educational affairs section shall be in charge of supervising the following aspects of activity:

Prepare, coordinate and issue the teaching programs.

Plan the curricula, have them approved by the Education Council and follow up on their implementation.

Secure educational aid and organize its distribution and use.

Organize the holding of examinations, prepare their results and present them for approval and announcement.

Prepare the progress reports for the various groups.

It shall be in direct supervision of the study plan and the educational and examination affairs unit.

Article 45: The study plan unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the study plan, present it to the Education Council and follow up its implementation after it is approved.

Prepare the study programs and announce them to the sections concerned after it presents them to the Education Council and after they are approved.

Nominate the teachers necessary to implement the study plan and present the nominations to the Education Council and the Training Agency.

Notify the agencies and authorities to which the teachers delegated to instruct at the institute belong so that they may approve the delegation.

Prepare the study lists and notify the teachers whose delegation is approved of the academic programs and dates.

Issue instructions organizing the course of work in the unit and announce these instructions to the various sections and units after they are presented to the Education Council and approved.

Prepare the statements of teaching recompense, record them and deliver them after consultation with the financial affairs.

Make a count of the textbooks for the various courses and secure them before the start of each course.

Collect the notifications concerning the institute teachers, whether the notifications to attend meetings or the notifications summoning them to the administration.

Prepare the records on the various necessary data concerning the teachers.

Article 46:

A. The educational affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Implement the study plan and notify the plan unit of the parts of the plan completed as soon as they are completed.

Make a daily check of teachers' presence and absence and present the result to the commander.

Observe regular holding of studies in all classes and prepare the daily reports on the teachers' presence.

Plan to keep classes from which teachers are absent occupied through cooperation with the study plan unit and within the limits of the program prepared for these classes,

Prepare a daily list of the names of the teachers and of the hours each of them has taught and deliver it, along with the daily attendance sheets, to the study plan unit.

Prepare a report before the conclusion of [the studies of] each group evaluating the educational situation concerning all the subjects taught and present it to the institute commander so that the teachers of the classes lagging behind may be notified to complete teaching the subject before the end of the group [course period].

Contact the teachers and discuss with them the memoranda [study materials] prepared according to the program of each subject and present them to the institute commander after they are approved by the Education Council so that he may take the necessary measures to have them printed before the start of the new study groups [course].

Submit the proposals made by any of the teachers and implement whatever decisions are made on these proposals.

B. The unit shall also prepare the following records:

A record of the minutes of the meetings of the teachers, including the date of meeting, the names of those present, the issues raised, a summary of the discussions in the meetings and the recommendations resulting from these meetings.

A record for each student group containing a daily count of the hours taught by each teacher according to the daily attendance sheets.

A daily record book on the presence, absence and tardiness of teachers.

Article 47: The examinations unit shall have the following tasks:

Make preparations for holding the examinations on the dates set by the study plan.

Prepare the seating numbers for the students in cooperation with the student affairs section.

Supervise implementation of the instructions issued on the holding of examinations and present the outcome of the committees' implementation of these instructions.

Prepare a list of the examination committees for each subject and present this list for approval.

Contact the committees that prepare the examinations with enough time before the examinations to obtain from them the questions for each examination and the ideal answers to the questions.

Take the necessary measures to print the examinations, taking into consideration the required confidentiality.

Prepare the answer papers and have them sealed with the seal of the institute commander.

Make a count of the truant and sick students staying at outside hospitals in cooperation with the student affairs section and do the necessary insofar as these students are concerned.

Continue the control procedures, distribute the examination papers, along with the ideal answers, for the purpose of correction, re-collect the papers and enter the grades in the cards and record books prepared for the purpose, taking the required confidentiality into consideration.

Prepare lists of the results, present them and announce them in cooperation with the student affairs section after these results are approved.

Study and analyze the results of the examinations and present the outcome of the study [to institute commander].

Prepare the graduation certificates, have them approved and send them to the authorities concerned.

Prepare the records, files and cards concerning examination affairs and prepare the instructions pertaining to them.

Article 48: The training section shall have the following tasks:

Draw up the annual training plan for the institute's officers, personnel and students.

Draw up the plan to prepare the teachers and assistant teachers by holding local courses and by nominating them for training courses abroad in accordance with the Training Agency's annual training plan.

Provide the officers and the teachers with the (instruction materials) for the various training branches.

Supervise supplying the unit with the training aids necessary for the various training branches.

Draw up the plan (to procure various items), such as instruments, equipment and clothing, in participation and coordination with the institute's officers.

Prepare records--cards--containing all the training data pertaining to all the institute workers.

Supervise the target shooting exercises [tawabir darb al-nar] and take part in giving lectures on weapons.

Record the activity of the institute's assistant instructors and make an evaluation of each of them.

The training section shall also be in direct control of training, target shooting, athletic and military training and library aid materials.

Article 49: The training aid materials unit shall have the following tasks:

Secure the training aid materials for the institute according to the actual needs.

Exert efforts to develop the training aid materials in a manner compatible with the development of education.

Keep a record of the training aid materials in the institute and preserve and maintain them.

Print and publish the references, memoranda and other educational and training documents belonging to the institute.

The shooting unit shall have the following tasks:

Train weapon instructors and supply them with equipment constantly and according to the program and exert efforts to unify their performance method.

Follow up implementation of the weapon training programs according to the curriculum and familiarize itself with the standard of absorption and performance.

Prepare and supply the firearms--submachineguns, handguns and rifles--and take the necessary measures to repair damaged weapons.

Supervise directly the shooting exercises and the disbursement of ammunition.

Collect the empty shells found in the firing range, along with ammunition consumption statements, and return the empty shells and the statements to the warehouse units.

Prepare, supply and maintain (shooting mats and targets).

Record the results of the examinations of students in the study groups and make an evaluation of their shooting standard.

Prepare the books, files and cards necessary for these activities.

Article 51: The physical education unit shall have the following tasks:

Supervise the institute's athletic games hall and fields, supply them with the necessary equipment and instruments and maintain them.

Train the institute students and workers in accordance with the athletic education programs and the self-defense methods.

Form athletic teams at the institute and supervise their training.

Supervise the dispensation and retrieval of sports clothes and instruments.

Make proposals to develop the athletic programs and self-defense.

Record the athletic results of the training courses and evaluate the level of the students.

Organize and keep the necessary files and records.

Article 52: The military training unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the military training programs for the various courses according to the approved curricula.

Supervise implementation by the instructors of the programs drawn up for each course.

Exert efforts to enhance the standard of the instructors and to continue development of the military training programs.

Organize and keep the necessary files and records.

Article 53: The library unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the library budget in cooperation with the publication section of the Training Agency.

Keep up with scientific writings so as to procure the latest books and references needed for teaching and training at the institute.

Organize internal and external [book] loans.

Record, classify, maintain and keep the books and references in the library.

Establish, organize and keep files, records and cards concerning the library.

Article 54: The student affairs section shall consist of battalions and companies, depending on the number of students, and shall have the following tasks:

Receive the students, familiarize them with the institute's work and study procedures, watch their attendance of classes and training on the scheduled dates and record their absence from and their discontinuance of their studies.

Care for the students' cultural, health, living and social affairs and help them solve the problems and overcome the difficulties that face them.

Investigate issues affecting the students' morale and present them, with recommendations, to the institute commander and the institute's second commander.

Conduct the investigations which the institute decides to conduct with the students and complete the investigations received by the institute in this regard.

Express its opinion on the leave permits that the student ask for, observe their use of the leave, their return from it and record the leave in their files.

Observe the students' performance of the tasks which the institute permits them to perform and observe their return from such tasks.

Coordinate visits and contacts and organize the delivery of mail belonging to the students.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for performing the abovementioned tasks.

Article 55: The administrative and financial affairs section shall take charge of the institute's administrative and financial affairs in a manner that guarantees that such services are performed properly at the institute.

The section shall consist of the personnel affairs unit, the administrative affairs unit, the secretarial unit, the supply unit and the financial affairs unit.

Article 56: The personnel affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Organize the service affairs of the institute's regular and civilian workers—affairs such as appointment, promotion, termination of service, transfer, delegation, leaves, penalties and so forth.

Record, issue and announce the institute's daily directives.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for the above-mentioned activities.

Article 57: The administrative affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Coordinate the services of the institute's regular and civilian workers and observe their arrival and departure.

Organize vehicle services and control the use, (fuelling) and maintenance of vehicles.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for the said activities.

Article 58: The secretarial unit shall have the following tasks:

Collect, sort out and distribute the institute's incoming and outgoing mail.

Organize the writing, copying, recording and filing operations.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for these activities.

Article 59: The supply unit shall have the following tasks:

Organize the process of providing the institute with supplies and follow up the implementation of this process.

Coordinate the kitchen, restaurant and laundromat services and the other utilities required for institute's students and workers.

Manage and control the help serving in the said utilities.

Article 60: The financial affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the institute's draft budget and propose the new financial plans.

Carry out the measures pertaining to contracts, purchases and supplies.

Organize the process of expense accounting, auditing and control.

Organize the warehouses and supervise the institute [premises].

Article 61: the technical research unit shall have the following tasks:

Sum up the experience gained from teaching and training and make proposals to develop the programs in cooperation and coordination with the various sections and units concerned.

Conduct studies connected with the institute's message, mission and teaching and training policy, organize the teachers' and instructors' participation in these studies, examine their recommendations and make conclusions on their outcome.

Keep up with the constant development in the crime and police sciences and in the methods, means and instruments of training and make it easy for the teachers and the instructors to familiarize themselves with this development.

Article 62: The relations unit shall have the following tasks:

Disseminate awareness of the institute's message, goals, tasks and accomplishments in cooperation with the various sections and units concerned.

Organize celebrations, visits and trips in cooperation and coordination with the authorities concerned.

Spend from the institute personnel recreation fund on the purposes for which the fund is allocated.

Coordinate the information operation.

Article 63: The institute's Education Council shall be comprised of:

The institute commander as chairman;

The second commander of each section, the commander's aides and the head of the technical research unit as members.

The Training Agency director may add to the Education Council members any experienced people he deems fit to add, to the limit of three members.

The technical research unit chief or his deputy shall carry out the duties of council secretary and shall supervise the council's permanent secretariat.

Article 64: The Education Council shall draw up the institute's work policy, shall follow up its implementation, shall evaluate its results, shall investigate the shortcomings or drawbacks in the spheres of teaching and training and shall propose the proper solutions for them.

The council shall also have the following tasks:

Draw up the institute's teaching and training plan, follow up its implementation and evaluate its results.

Set the institute's teaching and training methods, evaluate the curricula and the programs and propose their modification and development.

Approve the plan for training the teachers and the instructors.

Follow up the holding of examinations and tests, evaluate their results and discuss and assess the success reports.

Review the reports on inspections of the institute, study their results and recommendations and propose the means to deal with the shortcomings and drawbacks revealed by the inspection.

Discuss the institute's teaching and training problems, make proposals and recommendations on them and follow up the outcome of these proposals and recommendations.

Draw up the plan for spending from the appropriations allocated for the institute's training aid materials.

Approve the permanent directives concerning the institute's system issued by the institute director.

The council's decisions shall not become effective until approved by the Training Agency director.

Article 65: The council shall meet according to the institute commander's decision and its decisions shall be issued by absolute majority.

The minutes and decisions of the council meetings shall be recorded in a special file. The issues on which the council makes proposals or recommendations shall be referred to the Training Agency for consideration.

General Rules

Article 66: In exception from articles 4 and 11 of these bylaws, the minister of interior may approve the enrollment of students from the Arab or friendly countries. In this case, the students may be exempted from one or more of the acceptance conditions stipulated in article 4, provided that their state shoulder all the expenses in free currency, unless the minister decides to exempt them from all or part of these expenses.

Article 67: Supervision and observance of the first-phase students shall be performed by second-phase students selected from among those excelling educationally and militarily and given the following honorary ranks:

X First Sergeant

X Sergeant

X Corporal

Interim Rules

Article 68: Police warrant officers may be enrolled in the institute for training or for specialized studies when there is a need for such enrollment and only in accordance with a decision by the minister of interior.

8494

CSO: 4504/18

'OPEN WAR' HAS SUCCEEDED 'CONFLICT OF TENDENCIES'

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French No. 329 Aug 81 p 6

[Article by Ahmad Farouhy--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] As predicted, on 24 July the Iranians elected Mr Ali Raja'i, the current prime minister, as president of the republic. He thus succeeds Mr Bani Sadr, whose removal was officially announced by Parliament on 21 June.

The four candidates who entered the lists in the presidential election had the endorsement of the Islamic Republic Party. But while the number of individuals allowed to participate in the political arena was thus reduced, divergences within the Shiite movement have become exacerbated to such a point that one must now describe it in terms of open warfare.

The victory won by Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr in the presidential elections of January 1980 over the religious candidates; the clergy's success as a bloc within the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in the legislative elections of May 1980; the IRP's effort to limit the prerogatives of the chief of state; and finally the process unleashed by the party that led to the dismissal of Bani Sadr in June, have brought out into the open the merciless struggle between factions which has always divided the political wing of Iranian Shiism.

In effect, the various groups which carry the banner of Islam today in Iran have been in continual conflict over the political interpretation to be given to that religion, particularly with respect to the organization of the state. Two broad tendencies can be seen, however: one tendency preaches an Islamic state without the government being in the grip of the clerical apparatus; the other aspires to a theocratic state. Among the various groups favoring the first tendency, the strongest organization at present is that of the *mojahedin* of the people; as for the theocrats, they have coalesced within the IRP, which enjoys the unconditional support of Imam Khomeyni.

This split was revealed for the first time in the early 1960's. Some adherents of the (Mossadeghist) National Front--at that time the principal force in opposition to the shah's dictatorship--were dissatisfied with the secular and socialistic orientation of the front, and decided to leave it in order to found the Iran

Liberation Movement (MLI). Among its leaders were Mehdi Bazargan, who was later to become the first head of government of the Islamic republic. In addition to the nationalist, constitutionalist, and anti-imperialist positions of the Front, the MLI added the political dimension of Islam, saying that in a Moslem nation /"religion cannot be separate from political affairs."/ Unlike the National Front, which became increasingly secular, the MLI wanted to be the political expression of Iranian Shiism; it tried to build a bridge between the leftist intellectuals and the Muslim faithful. However, the religious insurrection of June 1963, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeyni, and the repression which followed it spurred the left wing of the MLI to break away from that movement, which was condemned as too tepid in terms of Islamic militancy and too legalistic in its tactics vis-a-vis the shah. The MLI dissidents decided therefore to go to armed struggle against the Pahlavi regime. In 1965, three of them--Mohammad Hanifnejad, Ali Asghar Badizadegan and Said Mohsen--formed the Organization of Combatants for the People of Iran, popularly known as the mojahedin. Over the years, the central core expanded, and a goodly number of new recruits were sent to be trained in Palestinian camps.

In August 1971, SAVAK (the political police) arrested Said Mohsen. In his pleadings before the military tribunal of Tehran¹ he briefly described the economic ideology which inspired the mojahedin and which, in substance, contradicted those of the theocrats, who were now under the undisputed leadership of Ayatollah Khomeyni.

/"In economic terms,"/ said Said Mohsen to the military court, /"we think that increasing production can only be made possible by mobilization of the people... This movement can only succeed if it takes account of two factors. First, the need for a profound change in attitudes and an elevation in the level of revolutionary awareness... The result of this will be to change people's thinking. Everyone feels himself responsible to others and toward the generations to come, thereby increasing solidarity between people, which is the will of the Creator. Individualism and private interest will disappear... Secondly, mobilization of the masses should be carried out in their interests, and not in the interests of those in a privileged class of capitalists and exploiters. If not, that same mobilization would become a means to perpetuate and accentuate the exploitation of man by man... If man can do what he wishes with himself, he should also have the possibility of controlling what he produces... It is for this reason that we do not accept the principle that anyone other than the producers have the right to make use of the fruits of their work."/ "That which the people harvest should not feed other mouths." /"This principle summarizes our economic conception of the future society: it results from our faith in Islam."/

The Mojahedin Against the Theologians

To this anticapitalist economic conception, which would later become even more resolutely collectivist, basing itself on a "socialist" interpretation of the Koran--the mojahedin add a vision of an organic organization of political life in the Islamic community. In short, this community should become its own "imam," guiding itself along the path to God, leaning toward a classless society without hierarchies and in oneness (/towhid/) with Him. The leadership of this community would emerge spontaneous from the base, so the theological class could not claim to exercise power. The refusal to yield leadership of the community to a class of theologian

savants arises thus from the fact that, for the mojahedin, Islam is opposed to classes, to social divisions, and above all does not recognize the clergy. It is on these basic points that the ideology preached by the mojahedin is categorically opposed to that of the Ayatollah Khomeyni.

In fact, to the thinking of the future imam of the Islamic republic², /"Islamic government is the government of Divine law over the people. This is what constitutes the fundamental difference between Islamic government and other constitutional governments, both monarchic and republican. Another fact of capital importance is that in these regimes the elected representatives of the people or the monarch make the laws, while in Islam the only lawmaker is God, the Holy Legislator."/

For the Ayatollah Khomeyni, the Islamic community should be governed in accordance with Koranic law and the /hadiths/ handed-down(stories which are the most important reference source outside the Koran). But who is in a better position to interpret them than the /faqih/ (the jurist specializing in the /feqh/, the theological sciences as a whole)/ Thus, /"Islamic government being the government of the Law, the doctors of Law and the theologians or faqihs must therefore be its guardians. It is they who watch over all executive, administrative, and planning affairs."/ In short, the administration of the state must be in the hands of the clerical apparatus: in the eyes of Ayatollah Khomeyni, only a theocracy can guarantee the strict application of the laws revealed by God and transmitted by the Prophet and his companions. So the idea of a "spontaneous," organic, classless society, and above all a society without clergy, is set against the mojahedin's idea of a society subject to divine immutable laws of which the mullahs are the interpreters: the Moslem secularism of the mohahedin against the Islamic theory of Imam Khomeyni³.

In the economic domain, the founder of the Islamic republic shows himself just as hostile to the mojahedin ideology as he is in the political domain. Conservative, a defender of capitalist enterprise and private property, Ayatollah Khomeyni asks only that the fiscal system called for by Islam--/djazie, kharadj, khoms and zakat/--be well administered. /"It is the responsibility of officials of the Islamic government to determine and then collect the taxes correctly and in a manner proportional to incomes, and finally to spend them for the good of the Moslems."/ Beyond that, the ayatollah confines himself to stating that it is the duty of the governing clerical apparatus to /"struggle against illegal profits, illicit gains,"/ without ever throwing into question the existing economic system⁴. These two tendencies were to coexist as long as the shah remained in power, the militants on either side preferring to work together to defeat the common enemy. By contrast, as soon as the regime fell, their alliance made no more sense.

Thus, the mojahedin are not represented on the Revolutionary Council, the supreme decision-making body which replaced the monarchic institutions--nor are they in Mr Bazargan's provisional government. The subsequent ostracism of the mojahedin by the imam is not limited to their exclusion from decision-making at the national level; it was also expressed, starting in spring 1979, by implacable criticism on radio and television of their activities and statements. Harassments and provocations, intimidation and brutality on the part of the pasdarans (Islamic militia) obliged the mojahedin to work semi-clandestinely, starting only a few months after

the fall of the Pahlavi regime. Two factors, finally, were to exacerbate the division in the Islamic movement, and would result in the violent conditions--verging on civil war--in which Iran today finds itself engulfed: the activities of the IRP and the establishment of the new state institutions.

Founded in March 1979 under the direction of Imam Khomeyni, the IRP immediately set itself the goal of monopolizing the key positions of power. But it had to eliminate liberals and secular nationalists who, under Bazargan's provisional government, had set themselves to opposing the arbitrary controls the clerical apparatus had clamped on the wheels of state. The prime minister and his MLI-National Front coalition cabinet showed themselves, however, to be incapable of stopping the irresistible rise of the PRI: the party enjoyed the support of the imam while they themselves were barely supported by the mojahedin, who never had confidence in the MLI and the National Front, preferring henceforth to see themselves excluded from the government rather than to sustain their struggle against the rising theocracy.

Thus, after the resignation of the Bazargan cabinet in November 1979, and following the purges within the state apparatus, the arbitrary imprisonments and the summary executions, the PRI finally found itself fully in control of Iranian political power. In order to govern, it nevertheless had to transform this /de facto/ power into /de jure/ power, as in the imam's view the supreme authority within the Islamic republic resided in the Parliament, which is responsible for ensuring that the administration of the state is being carried out in accordance with divine law. By giving primacy to parliamentary authority, this institutional structure enabled the theocrats who sat in it to paralyze, then to dismiss Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr--the first president of the republic--when he tried, like Bazargan, to oppose the hegemony of the IRP.

In effect, the constitution elaborated by the experts--including Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the IPR--and approved by a referendum in December 1979--allows Parliament at any time to control, censure, or countermand the actions of the president of the republic. The latter is quite limited in other respects too: according to Article 113 of the constitution, the role of the head of state is confined to /"coordination of relations among the three branches of government."/ According to articles 123 and 124, /"the president is obliged to sign the decrees of parliament"/ and can only /"propose a candidate for prime minister,"/ the latter's appointment depending on a vote of acceptance by Parliament. The executive power is held by a government that is constantly subject to draconian Parliamentary control.

Bani Sadr's election as president of the republic in January 1980 over the candidates of the IPR was a Pyrrhic victory: in May, the theocratic party won the legislative elections, obtaining an overwhelming majority of seats in the Parliament. Hoping to be the leader of a third force, situated between the mojahedin and the IPR, Bani Sadr was in fact crushed between the two rival movements. His presidential duties prevented him from moving closer to the mojahedin--described by the imam as /"traitors to Islam"/--while his constant criticism of the IRP's actions alienated the supporters of theocracy. The undeniable popularity of the chief of state with all classes of the population were nevertheless of little help in the face of the omnipotence of the clerical apparatus: the prisoner of a constitution which limited his jurisdiction, he refused to choose between

submission to the diktats of the IRP or resignation, opting instead for passive resistance. Thus, laborious negotiations between the chief of state and the IRP on the subject of the composition of the government began in summer 1980 and continued for more than 4 months. Nevertheless, in late September Bani Sadr saw Mohammad-Ali Raja'i, a confidant of Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the IRP, imposed as his prime minister. Immediately upon his appointment, the latter did everything possible in an effort to wrest away what little authority the secularists--thanks to Bani Sadr's presidency--still retained within the state apparatus.

Kept out of governmental decisions, the Iranian president played no role in the final resolution of the affair of the American hostages, which was entrusted by the imam to Parliament, while the prime minister was given the responsibility to implement its decisions. The Iraqi attack against Iran in late September 1980, and the war which followed, nevertheless enabled the chief of state to exercise the only authority he still unquestionably possessed, that of commander in chief of the armed forces. All the same, even on the front lines, the pasdarans (Islamic militia are also found to be the military wing of the IRP) participated in the fighting in an autonomous manner, beyond the control of the army, and thus of the president.

Increasingly stripped of the means to take any action, boycotted by radio and television, which did not report anything except the activities of the government and the Parliament, Bani Sadr launched a campaign through his newspaper REVOLUTION ISLAMIQUE against the decisions of the Raja'i cabinet and the monopolization of power by the clergy. The increasingly critical tone of REVOLUTION ISLAMIQUE--the newspaper at that time had the largest circulation of any Iranian publication--incited Ayatollah Beheshti, who, in addition to being the head of the IRP was also president of the Supreme Court, to launch a major offensive against the president.

The Final Enemies

In the first months of 1981, the leaders of the PRI perceived, in effect, the danger of a possible tactical alliance between the partisans of the chief of state and the mojahedin against the theocratic power. Their fears were reinforced in early March, when violent confrontations on the campus of the University of Tehran pitted supporters of Bani Sadr--for the first time joined by mojahedin--against the men of the IRP.

The conflict between the president and the theocratic party became more bitter after these events. The chief of state thenceforth refused to ratify a goodly number of governmental and parliamentary decisions, and in particular the one which made Prime Minister Raja'i the interim minister of foreign affairs. In order to resolve this conflict, the imam appointed an arbitration commission composed of three members of the clergy who were notorious for their pro-IRP bias, who found against Bani Sadr, and called for the shutting down of his newspaper, which was accused of /"sowing discord"/: this was carried out in early June. More and more convinced by Ayatollah Beheshti that the chief of state was an obstacle to theocratic power, the imam ended by setting himself openly on the IRP's side: on 10 June, the "guide of the revolution" relieved Bani Sadr of his responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces, while Ayatollah Beheshti implicitly

confirmed that the president would be prosecuted for having violated the constitution by refusing to ratify decisions of the government. On 13 June, fearing for his life, the president fled into hiding: so the machinery that would inevitably lead to his dismissal was set in motion. In effect, on 20 June, under constitutional procedures, the IRP members of parliament voted to declare the head of state /"politically incompetent"/ and the same night an arrest warrant was issued for him. However, according to article 110 of the constitution it is Imam Khomeyni who has, in the last resort, /"the power to discharge the president of the republic in the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court has decreed that the chief of state failed to perform his legal responsibilities or after the Parliament has noted to declare him lacking in political competence"/: the "guide of the revolution" made use of this right the next day after the parliamentary vote.

Having thus swept aside the only obstacle to their total domination of the apparatus of the state, are the theocrats now going to hurl themselves against the only enemies who may still be capable of challenging their leadership of the country: the mojahedin? The dismissal of Bani Sadr marked an important turning point in the implacable factional struggle the mojahedin and the IRP are waging for leadership of the Iranian Shiite political movement. The bloody confrontations between the mojahedin and the pasdarans on the eve of the fall of the chief of state, the summary executions the following day, the attack on 28 June which decimated the leadership of the IRP--killing Ayatollah Beheshti, four ministers, six deputy ministers and one-fourth of the PRI parliamentary group--the wave of arrests, the dozens of executions of leftist militants--including a number of mojahedin--as well as the many armed attacks against the regime which have taken place since then, lead one to think that the conflict of tendencies within the Islamic movement has now been transformed into open war.

FOOTNOTES

1. Documents of the Iranian Revolutionary Movement, "Organization of the Moudjahiddin of the Iranian People" (Volume I), ed. Abu-Dhar in Farsi, 1977 (published clandestinely).
2. Cf. Houkoumate-Eslami, Nadjaf (Iraq), 1971. Transcription of the political reflections of Imam Khomeyni. French translation, "Toward an Islamic Government," Paris, Fayolle, 1979.
3. We note here that Iran is a special case, for the secular-clerical conflict is played out within the Islamic movement and not outside of it, as in the case of other Muslim countries. Cf. Ahmad Faroughy, "Secularism and Theocracy in the Near East," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, November 1980.
4. Cf. "Toward an Islamic Government," pp 37 and 103.

9516

CSO: 4619/25

PAPER QUESTIONS U.S. MIDEAST NUCLEAR PLAN

JN150744 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 15 Aug 81 pp 1, 18

[Editorial: "The Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East and the U.S. Efforts To Restrict Their Proliferation"]

[Text] The news published yesterday on U.S. efforts to conclude a charter banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East means that Washington is seeking through all possible means to prevent any of the region's states from obtaining nuclear weapons in order to guarantee that only the Zionist entity could possess these weapons and to eventually guarantee a continued Israeli military supremacy and a continued U.S.-Zionist hegemony over the region's peoples and destinies.

Washington knows better than others that Israel is the only party among the Middle East states which possesses nuclear weapons and that it is also the only party which has not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It has rejected any surveillance over the Dimona reactor despite its allegation that this reactor is used for peaceful purposes.

It is obvious that the U.S. choice of this particular time to start its efforts is linked with the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and with the Iraqi Government's serious efforts to rebuild this reactor, which will, of course, be subjected to international surveillance. Hence, one understands that the U.S. efforts in this regard will include negotiations with the big powers, something which means that Washington will try to exert pressure on the French and other governments which may cooperate with Iraq in rebuilding its peaceful nuclear reactor in order to make them stop this cooperation.

Consequently, the question Washington has to answer is: Will Israel abide by the abovementioned agreement? Will this abidance mean the removal of the nuclear weapons Israel currently possesses, or will Israel, at least, agree to subject its nuclear installations to international surveillance? If the answer is positive, the Arab states will certainly be the first to welcome the efforts the United States is talking about and all the efforts aimed at keeping nuclear threat away from the region.

CSO: 4804/115

SHARON'S NEW POLICY TRIES TO DECEIVE ARABS

JN151818 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 15 Aug 81

[Station commentary: "The Israeli Policy of Leniency Is an old Policy in a new Form"]

[Text] Israeli Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon stressed that Israeli soldiers will not behave like masters of an invaded land. They will behave as guards of peace whose task is to keep order and to secure the citizens' security and welfare. In other words, Israeli soldiers will deal with the people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as guards of security and not as invading soldiers.

What Sharon stressed is not the result of a new philosophy but of a new method of dealing with the people of the Bank and Strip after all other methods of oppression, displacement, evacuation, arrest, allurements, subservience and attempts at containment have failed.

It is necessary for the observer to look behind the smooth words. It is a must that one should not be bewildered by the luster of slogans without trying to reach reality of the intentions behind them. What Sharon stressed necessitates a lengthy study to expose what is behind the words and prove that there is no change in Israeli intentions and plans.

When Sharon declares that his soldiers will not be invaders but guards of security, he stresses that the role of these soldiers as occupiers has ended and that it is time they acted as owners of the land after 14 years of occupation. He stresses that the Palestinians are just a minority living on Israel's land whose links will be with the police like any other minority in any other country. This means denying the Arabs their citizenship in the occupied land and dealing with them as members of a minority who must not violate the status of being guests on Israel's land. He stresses that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of Israel, the removal of the large barrier at the (Erta) point near the Gaza Strip is the first step in Israel's policy of annexing all the occupied Arab lands. The removal of the barrier was coupled with the establishment of movable barriers and sudden searches between the Bank and the Strip as a security measure adopted by any state on its lands.

What seems an attempt to break the ice between the Arabs in occupation is but an attempt to extinguish the flame of Arab rejection and to besiege it with a policy which appears to be less harsh, but which has in reality graver results and

consequences. Occupation remains to be occupation. The attempt to turn the soldiers of the invasion into guards of peace and security does not change the established facts and does not cover the fact that the Israelis occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that their people are citizens and owners of land who reject and resist occupation. These people have the right to live on their own land. The attempt to limit this issue to the Israeli police and security organs is a frank denial, though implicit, of the Arabs' citizenship and all their legitimate rights as citizens in their lands which are dominated by occupation.

It is certain that the near future will witness a lot of Israeli measures, resolutions and statements which fall within this new policy and which might seem to be an interpretation of the policy of leniency, as it is termed by the Israelis, in dealing with the people of the bank and the strip. This policy might appear to be a positive Israeli change in the interest of the Arabs in the occupied lands. To realize the grave goals of Sharon's declaration is enough to put us all face to face with the new methods of Begin's government, whose existence depends on the support of the extremist religious parties. These parties refuse to withdraw from any occupied land and insist on more expansion and the establishment of occupation.

When we couple Begin's and Sharon's extremist stands with those of the religious parties, we are able to understand the new Israeli policy of leniency and its dangerous goals. We will be able to alert all those who might be deceived by the appearances of this policy based on dealing with the Palestinian in the Bank and the Strip as guards of security and not as soldiers of invasion and occupation. In other words, this means dealing with the Palestinians as a minority through the police and security organs. It means depriving them of their citizenship, land and all their rights which the world community has recognized and called for their practice of these rights on their own soil.

CSO: 4304/115

COMMENTARY CONDEMNS DECISION ON FUNDS TO WEST BANK

JN051851 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 5 Aug 81

[Station commentary]

[Text] The Israeli occupation authorities' decision banning the delivery of the Arab aid funds to the municipalities of the occupied Arab cities through the channel of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee is just another step that comes within the framework of the policy of suppression which is practiced against the residents of the occupied Arab land in order to deprive them of hope, further entrench Israeli occupation of Arab land and spread more Jewish settlements over Arab soil. This decision cannot be separated from the other maneuvers and movements that are taking place in southern Lebanon or those that are being prepared by the U.S. and Egyptian presidents.

As for what happened and is still happening in Lebanon in light of the fragile truce which was agreed upon by the Begin-led Israeli Government--for Begin's government was forced to accept this truce for different temporary considerations such as: devoting all efforts to form a new Israeli Government under the Likud, securing a period of calm necessary for restoring self-assurance and high morale to the Jewish settlers in northern Israel and attempting to stop the unprecedented campaigns of criticism and condemnation of the Israeli rulers which came from all over the world and from the United States--we say that all this is just another link in the chain of measures that are intended to contain increasing understanding of and support for the Arab stand and for the PLO in particular.

As it was expected, Israel is now violating the cease-fire agreement and is sending warships to shell Palestinian resistance positions on the Lebanese coast. Also the Egyptian president is in Washington trying to revive the talks of the self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It is certain, therefore, that there is a logical and organic connection among all these events and developments that aim at imposing a fate accompli on the residents of the occupied Arab territories, a step that is in line with the Camp David process which has failed to bring about a just and comprehensive peace simply because it has ignored, and is still ignoring, the crux of the problem as well as the most important side in it, namely, the Palestinian people represented by the PLO.

Yesterday, a Jordanian official's statement reiterated Jordan's firm and clear stand on the ongoing attempts to bring about a settlement that will satisfy no one but Israel, the United States and Egypt. Such a settlement will naturally be blessed by Egypt which is still risking its fate as well as that of the entire Arab region through insisting on the Camp David march and attempting to impose the self-rule plan as engineered by Israel under the leadership of Begin.

The Jordanian official reconfirmed Jordan's stand which says that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Hence, Jordan announces its rejection of the Camp David agreements which ignore the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights in their own soil and national homeland.

In light of the new Israeli Government's statements and intentions to annex the entire Palestinian land to the State of Israel, the Egyptian-U.S. talk about self-rule is considered a cover which attempts to give Zionism enough time to swallow up the Palestinian land, to force a fate accompli in the area and to strike at the Palestinian cause inside and outside the Palestinian land.

Hence, the decision to ban the Arab aid fund for the West Bank and Gaza Strip is another link in the chain of policies that intend to destroy Arab life inside the occupied territories. By adopting these policies, Israel hopes to separate the Arab land from its residents, to swallow it up and to bring about the objectives of the Zionist extremists and the fanatic members of the Torah parties represented in Begin's government, which itself stems from extreme Zionist principles.

CSO: 4304/115

BOOK BY CROWN PRINCE REVIEWED

JN160821 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 16 Aug 81 p 3

[Review by Tawfiq Ahmad al-Khalil of the book "Palestinian Self-Determination: A Study of the West Bank and Gaza Strip" written by "Hasan ibn Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan. Published in London by Quartet Books: 138 pages, with illustrations"]

[Text] His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hasan's latest book on Palestine contains 138 pages of well-documented material divided into five sections, with a foreword and maps.

The sections include an introduction, historical background, legal issues, an appraisal of the legal claims, proposed solutions and finally a perspective for peace.

The foreword and introduction place the Palestine problem in its correct setting, preparatory to the historical background, which gives the reader a clear view of the injustice that has befallen the Palestinian Arabs, and the deprivation they have suffered for over 60 years. This is presented in an intelligent, lucid and scholarly fashion.

Perhaps one of the better statements characterising the Palestine issue is that which comes at the beginning of the foreword: "Historically," the author states, "seldom have unity, self-determination, statehood and security been so bedeviled as in the case of Palestine."

The third section shows us the legal basis of the Palestinian claim to self-determination and the establishment of an autonomous state in the West Bank of Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. These claims and their bases are explained in detail. At the risk of being repetitious, the writer has had to go back in time to emphasise the legality of such claims, bringing them up to date; and to enumerate them more than once, possibly in order to enable these facts to penetrate--especially into the Western mind, which until very recently has been unable or unwilling to grasp them, and also to refute Israel's illegal counterclaims.

It is made clear in this part of the book that whereas the Palestinians have until now been denied any opportunity to achieve statehood, massive illegal Jewish and [as published] immigration into Palestine has very seriously upset the demographic, social and economic balance in the country, and allowed the Zionists to usurp a state by force as early as 1948. And the process of "elbowing out" the indigenous Arab Palestinian continues until the present day.

It is high time that the legal claims of the Palestinians to their territory were put forward in such a manner, and it is high time that the unjustifiable Israeli claims be contested. This is done successfully in the largest section of the book. Put quite simply, the author confronts Israeli legal and political apologists on their doorstep, and defeats them at their own game.

It is in the chapters on the appraisal of legal claims and proposed solutions that the writer comes into his own, when he states that Israel knows that there will be no peace as long as Israelis deny the Palestinians their homeland. "A proud and ancient people such as the Palestinians cannot be kept out of their lands or in subjection to Israeli military power in the West Bank and Gaza forever," he writes.

So, as he concludes perhaps the solution lies in Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, reaffirmed in resolution 338, delineating the requirements for peace between Arab and Israeli, whose implementation may result in "a little bit of territory against a little bit of peace."

Israel's present posture in the West Bank and Gaza and its decision to remain there for "security" reasons may be very convenient, but it is illegal, and is detrimental to world peace.

A just and comprehensive settlement based upon the "reinstatement of the rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, and to determine their future and to establish an independent Palestinian state on their national soil" is what is required to put an end to their long years of suffering, and is the only way in which peace and stability are going to reign in this region.

Finally, the author concludes, there is no other option for the Israelis but to deal directly with the Palestinians "in a general conference of settlement," and Israel has "to be prepared to live with a new Arab state of Palestine."

CSO: 4300/87

KUWAIT

FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON LEBANON, GULF AFFAIRS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 17 Jul 81 p 3

[Interview with al-Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad: "Lebanon Will Continue to be Arab; They are Optimistic About Solving the Problem; Events in Iran Will Reflect on the Region as a Whole"]

[Text] Al-Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, deputy prime minister, foreign minister and minister of information, said that the Arab follow-up committee to bring peace to Lebanon will continue its efforts, so long as there are hopes for a solution to the issue in Lebanon.

Shaykd Sabah al-Ahmad, in an interview with the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, which is published in Arabic in both London and Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, expressed his optimism at recent developments in Lebanon, with regard to solving the Lebanese problem, and he said that Lebanon will continue to be Arab.

The foreign minister praised what he called the promise of the Phalangists to sever relations with Israel. He said that the remaining points of dispute between the Lebanese contending parties have reached the point of each solutions, by means of holding a round table for these parties.

He stressed that legitimacy in Lebanon would only be achieved when every Lebanese citizen respected the authority of his country, and his loyalty was to it and not to any quarter or organization.

On the other hand, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad stated that his recent visit to Moscow was none of the other Gulf states' business.

Regarding Kuwait's determination to obtain Soviet arms, he said: "We do not fear Soviet experts, but we have not yet asked for any Soviet expert to assist in training the army on Soviet weapons."

Concerning the Gulf Cooperation Council, the foreign minister said that Iraq had not been disqualified from the council, but the nations of the council were similar, and were able to have a kind of agreement and cooperation, without the need for unity or a federation.

Shaykh Sabah commented on the recent explosions that occurred in scattered areas of Kuwait, and said that the Kuwaiti government did not think that some sabotage

activities were unusual, because the area was volatile, and he underscored that Kuwait would not change its policy, no matter what the circumstances.

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad called for an end to the bloodshed between Iraq and Iran, and indicated that events in Iran would reflect on the region as a whole.

Text of the Interview

The following is the text of the interview:

[Question] To what extent will the Arab follow-up committee's efforts continue in order to bring peace to Lebanon?

[Answer] So long as there are hopes for a solution to the issue in Lebanon, the committee's efforts will continue. Praise God, I now have a feeling that there are signs of hope, especially concerning the main issue, which the committee is facing, and I mean by that the question of cooperation with Israel, which was always an obstacle to the committee's work, in its capacity as a representative of the Arab nations, present in Lebanon under Arab auspices. We have heard about the Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis confirmation that relations between the Phalangists and Israel have been severed.

In fact, this matter will cause the committee to continue, if this is true. It will help it to find Lebanon in a state of serenity, to find it united and independent under the legal authority. Seven long years of killing and hatred among brothers is enough.

Lebanon Will Continue to be Arab

[Question] What is your view concerning the nature of the pledge, accepted by the committee, regarding the severing of relations between the Phalange and Israel?

[Answer] The truth is that I have not read the statement submitted to President Sarkis, and my knowledge of that is confined to what I have heard on the news. We have tried to obtain a copy of the statement, but we have been unable, because it was handed to the president in trust. Despite that, if this gratifying statement was issued, measures will follow, first of all, to open up all of Beirut, and to hand public property over to the state. There are other measures which would come later. However, we should say that the best thing is the severing of relations with Israel, because this concerns us very greatly, since we do not want a faction of the Lebanese dealing with Israel. We want Lebanon to continue to be Arab. It will remain Arab, God willing.

Arab Guarantees to the Lebanese Front

[Question] Lebanese Front leaders, on various occasions, have expressed their willingness to sever relations with Israel, in exchange for Arab guarantees. It is well known that Syria rejects the offering of such guarantees. Is there a formula for another solution? And does the committee reject offering such guarantees as these?

[Answer] First of all, I want to make it clear that after offering the Lebanese Front the desired guarantees, I believe that Syria would not think a single day about remaining in Lebanon. This is something that is well known to the Lebanese themselves, because Syria's remaining in Lebanon is not because it wants to remain, so much as it is to protect Lebanon and the Lebanese. Therefore, when we have obtained a pledge to sever relations with Israel, and we have been convinced of it, we shall ensure with our Syrian brothers that we shall give guarantees to those brethren who fear the presence of Syrians or Arabs in Lebanon, because this entire army would not be against them for one day, as much as they would be with them and with Lebanon as a whole, in order to maintain it and to preserve its security.

The Lebanese Paper

[Question] With regard to the Lebanese document, submitted to the committee, it has been mentioned that it contained several Lebanese proposals and concepts in order to try to bring peace to Lebanon, and solve its problems. As a member of the committee, do you believe that this document will achieve the Lebanese dreams?

[Answer] There is a proverb that says: Whatever man desires, he gets. The document submitted to the committee contains several ideas regarding the political and security areas, including the army. However, the most important thing in this paper is the article on severing relations with Israel, which is considered to be at the forefront of the articles. Then there are other articles concerning conciliation and dialogue.

We hoped to conclude the primary problem, which is severing relations with Israel, by virtue of the fact that it was the primary obstacle before any action. Consequently, the rest of the points will be easy, whether pertaining to accord, or the army, or constitutional amendments. They can be solved at the round table, which will be agreed to. We must not rush matters to a solution in one day or night.

The Lebanese Army

[Question] Some Syrian quarters consider the Lebanese army to have Phalangist loyalties. Based on this, how can the army be reorganized to enable the legal authorities to deploy it in sensitive spots, without difficulties?

[Answer] With respect to this matter, I believe that the army is Lebanese, not Arab or Syrian. The people of Lebanon themselves know a way to deal with this problem. In the world of today, it is not easy to find anything pure, because you will find both good and evil.

It is possible that a kind of agreement could be reached, to eliminate everything that is bad, retain some of the army, and then build a new army based on service to the flag. This will require a long time, but help can be had from the loyal part of the Lebanese army.

[Question] Therefore, based on that, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia submitted some ideas to the Lebanese president, concerning reorganization of the Lebanese army. Was this rejected by President Sarkis?

[Answer] There was neither rejection nor acceptance, as much as there was consultation regarding this matter, because the army was split, whether with those group or that. However, some of the army was not divided. There are some officers who might have been displeased with the Lebanese legal government. It is assumed that they will not remain in authority. Nevertheless, all this has not been thoroughly discussed.

Legality and Lebanese Accord

[Question] When do you think legality will be achieved in Lebanon, after this tragedy in which it has been living?

[Answer] This will be achieved, when each individual respects the sovereign power in Lebanon. This is legality and will continue to be, because if matters continue in this fashion, man will begin to only respect the rifle, and his loyalty will be to a specific region or to a specific town.

[Question] Let us go back to the promise requested from the Phalangists. Do you think that submitting it will give impetus to the theory of national accord, so that that can be achieved easily?

[Answer] National accord is mentioned in the Lebanese paper, and will be discussed at the next meeting. Since I have not received a copy of the pledge, I cannot give an opinion. In any case, I welcome the matter in principle. I am also pleased by this initiative by some of the factions in Lebanon, which possibly have been mistaken or in error, and now have returned to reason.

[Question] However, the problem of Lebanon is not just with the Lebanese Front. There is South Lebanon, and there are situations in other areas. When will the legal government be extended to these areas?

[Answer] In fact, the problem of South Lebanon is different from the rest of the other problems. In Lebanon, one can negotiate with Arabs, and the negotiations can be between Arabs and other Arabs. In the South, there is Israel. We are not authorized to negotiate with it. On the contrary, we would never accept that. Despite this, the problem of the South is considered to be one of the items of the Lebanese concept submitted to the committee. We would be happy to find, with our brothers in Lebanon, any solution that will assist them, so that there would be Lebanese army authority in the South, in addition to the UN authority. It has been decided to keep the emergency forces in the South.

We Paid Our Commitments to the Deterrent

[Question] Why did you refuse to pay the financial obligations to the deterrent forces, and have you had reservations about them?

[Answer] In fact, Kuwait did not refuse to pay the obligations, but only had reservations. The reason for this reservation was that it had been agreed that a report would be submitted about these forces' missions. We asked once, and then again, but no report was submitted to us. Finally, we reserved the matter of payment. However, in light of the present circumstances, which Syria is experiencing, we decided to pay the obligations.

[Question] Do you support other Arab forces joining with the Syrian forces in their mission in Lebanon, and is it considered a joint Syrian-Lebanese request?

[Answer] This proves that the Syrian brothers are not desperate to stay in Lebanon, as we believe. Others have welcomed an Arab army from the Arab states, to assist in maintaining security in Lebanon. This matter has been proposed, but so far, considerations of Arab accord have not helped that.

Arab Summit in November

[Question] Let us leave Lebanon for now, and deal with Arab accord in the light of present circumstances. Have you called for an urgent Arab summit?

[Answer] First, there has been some confusion regarding what has been said about my calling for an Arab Summit. I have not issued an invitation as such, because this is within the purview of the Arab states. However, all I said was that there should be a conference held soon, and that I wanted all matters to be discussed, because, as is known, the summit will be held in November. That is not very far away. This summit must seriously discuss all matters, especially after the events that have recently occurred, such as the strike against the Iraqi reactor, and so forth.

[Question] However, don't you think it unlikely that positive decisions will come out of the summit, in light of the present Arab circumstances?

[Answer] With respect to the Arab disputes, I think that this is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that there have been differences. However, when bad times come, you find agreement on the basis of the proverb which says: "Me and my brother against my cousin; me and my cousin against the stranger."

We have a precedent in the past that supports that. That is 1973, when we were able to gain the respect of the world. However, unfortunately, after the present fragmentation, we have lost even that respect. We must regain our respect, and this is what we will be working for in our next meeting.

[Question] Regarding the European initiative, French President Mitterand has a negative attitude toward it. Do you have a comment?

[Answer] Some of what he said was unfortunately true, but President Mitterand sent an envoy to His Highness the Amir, with a letter. They are constantly affirming that they have not changed their policies toward the Arab nations.

Gulf Military Cooperation

[Question] Let us talk frankly about the Gulf Cooperation Council. Is cooperation in military matters unlikely, and has it been confined to just economic, social and cultural affairs?

[Answer] It is correct that the Cooperation Council, in its articles or basic laws, has not made any mention of matters relating to military or security affairs. This is a point. As to why it was confined to other areas, that stems from our

feeling that this was the object of concern to the peoples of our countries. Therefore, based on that, the Arab peoples must be bound together. We should not initially raise military or security matters. Binding our peoples together was our initial concept; later, we can pursue the matters that must be attended to.

[Question] Why postpone military cooperation, when the region, as is being said, faces various threats?

[Answer] The fact is that I differ with you, in the way that you put your question about this point concerning threats to the region. The question is from whom is this danger, and why? Because those who want to think something, must ask themselves about the benefit from that. Is it for oil? I think oil is still open. Then, why?

Therefore, we do not want to think that there are dangers, or that we are threatened, or that there is any quarter that wishes to attack our country. Despite that, I agree with you that there must indeed be security cooperation among ourselves, because unfortunately, our region is a plaything regarding matters not in the region's best interests. There must be a shield for security cooperation in this regard.

As regards the military sphere, you can standardize your weapons and training, but until the arms factories are in your region, that is all. This will come to pass in the future, when these matters are discussed.

[Question] Therefore, as concerns this matter, you do not share the point of view of the Sultanate of Oman regarding the threats that confront it?

[Answer] Here I speak in my country's name. I might not share in some of its observations relating to security in the region, but that does not mean that we differ with it. Oman has in fact submitted a working paper in this regard, but my view is that it should be discussed in the next meeting of the council's foreign ministers. This is natural, and in truth, the leadership has not studied the Omani paper, sufficiently, so as to be able to make a judgment on it. Therefore, they have asked that the next meeting of the ministers be postponed, along with submitting a report regarding it to the summit.

Mediation Between Aden and Muscat

[Question] In this context, why did the mediation efforts, which you began, along with the UAE foreign minister, between Aden and Oman cease?

[Answer] Mediation has not ceased. It may have stopped publically, but we are in touch with the brothers in South Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman. We hope that we shall reach an agreement.

[Question] But do you think that it will be easy to achieve reconciliation between two countries, after a separation of 10 years? And what about the conditions posed by Oman, regarding restoration of relations?

[Answer] The fact is that the question of setting conditions is the reverse of what you said. The truth is that Aden submitted certain specific points. I don't say conditions. Those points have been studied by the brothers in Oman, and some of them in Aden. I have sent the director of my office to Oman, and I shall be in touch with South Yemen. I have considerable hope that all problems will be resolved. I would not say that the problems of the past 10 years would prevent restoration of relations, because there were problems, for many long years, between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Despite that, things calmed down, and now there are good relations, and the two countries have ambassadors. This would not prevent relations from deteriorating, and then improving back to good relations.

The Moscow Visit

[Question] There have been several interpretations about your recent visit to Moscow. Would you give us the true version of the purpose for the visit, and the subjects discussed?

[Answer] First to counter what has been said. My visit to Moscow does not pertain to any of the Gulf states. We are the only state in the region that has good relations, tying us to Moscow, and we are proud of these relations. I went there, and this is not the first time that I have officially visited Moscow, to discuss many matters that interest the two countries, and concern the region and the world as a whole. We might not agree on many points. For example, I would not agree with the Soviet Union regarding Afghanistan. However, that does not mean that I am its enemy. From its viewpoint, it feels that what has happened there is a matter of maintaining its security. As for my point of view, it is different. It is a military occupation. Many matters could not be agreed upon, but that does not prevent there being mutual respect and mutual friendship between Kuwait and the Soviet Union.

[Question] In light of what has been said about Kuwait urging the other Gulf states to establish relations with Moscow, are you undertaking such a role? What would the reflections of that be on the balance in the region?

[Answer] It is not my business to advise these states, but I would like someday to find that they have good relations with the Soviet Union, as does the United States, and as does France or England. As regards reflections of that, I believe that it is natural to exchange diplomatic relations with any state, especially a major power. What is the matter with that; what are we condemning? If you are convinced that this is in your best interests, there is nothing wrong with it.

Soviet Experts

[Question] You are following a course of diversifying armaments. Based on that, you have bought arms from Moscow and from some other Western nations. With regard to arms from Moscow, will you be asking for assistance from Soviet experts to train the Kuwaiti army, or from Arab experts? And if you seek Soviet expert help, aren't you afraid of the repercussions of that on your security, in light of other nations' experience in that regard?

[Answer] I would be concerned about the presence of Soviet experts in my country, since when they came, they would be under a kind of surveillance. The agreement between us and their government would be that this is their limit and this is my limits.

This is not the first time that we have bought arms from Eastern nations. We have always sought help from Arab states, to train our men on these weapons. In this context, we have sought help from Syria and Egypt, before we broke off relations with it, since both use Russian weapons. In fact, I have not requested any Russian expert, but were I to ask for any someday, it would not frighten me, because, before I ask for them, they would have to know their limitations.

What Happens in Iran Reflects on the Region

[Question] How do you view developments of the situation in Iran, and repercussions of the Iraqi-Iranian war on the region's security?

[Answer] We must not forget that Iran is in the region, and not far away. Everything that happens there reflects on the region as a whole. I can only say that we do not want our region turned into a conflagration. We want our brothers in Iran to understand that they must stop the bloodshed currently going on between Iraq and Iran, for the good of Iran and the entire region.

Iraq Has Not Been Excluded From the Cooperation Council

[Question] What is your comment on the Iraqi president's recent statements, in which he made it clear that he wanted [to join], even if not publically, the Gulf Cooperation Council, at the present time? And why has Iraq been excluded from the council, since it is a Gulf nation, facing upon it?

[Answer] The answer to this question, in light of present circumstances, is difficult. Despite that, I would like to stress that Iraq has not been excluded. Every Iraqi individual must understand, to the extent possible, that these states are all similar, and are capable of having a kind of agreement and cooperation among themselves, without the need for unity or federation. This is well known. I don't think that I can comment further on this matter.

[Question] Kuwait has been threatened recently by several security incidents. It was said that they were aimed at dissuading Kuwait from its public positions, regarding certain issues. Do you believe that such actions as these would cause you to change your positions?

[Answer] We should not think it unlikely that incidents will happen here and there. We are in a volatile region. At the present time, Kuwait is different from what it used to be in the past. Kuwait now has a population of one and one-half million persons, who are a mixture of different nationalities. Therefore, we do not consider such incidents as these to be unusual. Regarding what was said about their being aimed at changing Kuwait's policy, Kuwait's policy stems from its beliefs. Its policy will not change, no matter what the circumstances. This will continue to be our policy, and nothing that happens will dissuade us.

As for certain subjects, located in Kuwait, carrying out acts of sabotage, this is not unusual, because you can find deviants even in one family. Based on this, we do not think it strange to find three or four deviants, out of 250,000. On the contrary, in my opinion, the Arab brothers living here were more upset over this than were the people of Kuwait ourselves, because they live with us. In any event, there are deviants, and we must not think about them.

Syrian-Soviet Maneuvers

[Question] What is your opinion regarding the joint Syrian-Soviet maneuvers, currently being held off the coast of Syria, to confront the threat of the Israeli enemy?

[Answer] I have not received anything official concerning it. Everything I have seen about it has come from the American news agencies. As regards the so-called missile crisis, the Arab world has shown its support for Syria, and Kuwait was among those nations that supported it. The Amir of our country has been in touch with the Syrian president, expressing that support. In the Arab world, we shall continue to support Syria in its ordeal with Israel.

[Question] To what extent do you support the British initiative relative to Afghanistan?

[Answer] We are with, and support, any initiative that removes foreign forces from Afghanistan. This is not just a matter of only Soviet forces, but rather, I mean that any country occupied by foreigners must be freed from that occupation.

7005

CSO: 4304/86

BEIRUT PUBLICATION RIDICULES SHARON'S POLICY

JN151849 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1545 GMT 15 Aug 81

[From "With the Events" program: Article published in Beirut AL-NIDA' of 15 August entitled "Strong Men Who Make Concessions or a Liberal Cover for the Zionist Grip?"]

[Excerpts] It is said that a strong ruler is the most capable of making concessions. It is also said that the most extremist (?force) is the one most capable of showing flexibility, at least proceeding from the premise of (?pardoning) or proceeding from the theory which says that the one who wants to make concessions should have something to offer and be strong enough to do so.

Al-Sadat's visit to Israel was made within this context. He believed himself strong enough to make concessions and relinquish everything while remaining strong. He never thought that the road of the U.S. peace process would end up with a stalemate. The same thing is being said of Menahem Begin.

The same thing can be said of the new defense minister, the known terrorist Ari'el Sharon, who is considered a special figure in Begin's second term of office. This minister, who is known for his direct confiscation of Palestinian and other Arab land, [words indistinct] announcing the application of a new policy for the Palestinian inhabitants, the sons of the occupied land. Our doors are open to you, Sharon told public figures in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Knock and all doors will be opened to you. Ask and you will be given. No mass punishment as of today. I, Sharon, will visit the territories, leaders and villages.

However, this liberal openness which the terrorist minister is (?proposing) is conditional, as the military command in [words indistinct] to two matters: the first is the continuation of Israeli occupation without opposition and without disturbing the occupiers. The second matter is creating an amenable climate for the application of Palestinian self-rule and encouraging the emergence of political negotiators in the occupied land, other than those who have proclaimed allegiance to the PLO.

By temptations on one hand and threats on the other, Sharon is hoping to isolate the PLO and lessen its influence in the occupied land while the aggression against the Palestinian resistance and its allies in Lebanon continues. The search for alternatives to the PLO is an old trend. Sharon's predecessors tried to find such alternatives and failed. Some Arabs tried, Al-Sadat did later, and failed too. All

signs indicate that neither Sharon nor those who are stronger and fiercer than he can create any alternative to the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. As for trying to (?separate) the people from the PLO, Sharon will live and die before achieving this illusion. Our kinfolk know what the intentions of Begin's defense minister are by making these proposals. They know that the Zionist leader put forth these ideas to alleviate the feeling of political loss in Israel resulting from the cease-fire, which constitutes a recognition of the existence, role and strength of the PLO.

CSO: 4304/115

BRIEFS

VEHICLE ATTACKED IN BEIRUT--While the security situation has registered noticeable progress in most areas, a shooting incident took place before noon today in the al-Rawshah area of Beirut. Armed men attacked a vehicle carrying Ilyas Hannush, alias al-Hanash; inconclusive reports say that Ilyas Hannush, his two sons and two of his companions were killed in this incident while other reports say that Ilyas Hannush was killed together with two of his companions. [Text] [NC161013 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1000 GMT 16 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/115

LIBYA

BRIEFS

DEFENSE CHIEF MEETS FOREIGN OFFICIALS--Commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, Brig Abd Bakr Jabir Yunis, this morning held a working session with Chadian Defense Minister Adoum Togoi, who is now on a visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. A number of Libyan Armed Forces officers participated in the meeting together with members of the delegation accompanying the Chadian defense minister. Brigadier Yunis met at noon today with Col Gen Antanas Semerdzhiev, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the general staff of the Bulgarian Socialist Republic, who is on a visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya at present. [Text] [LD121346 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 12 Aug 81]

CSO: 4504/56

PREMIER OUTLINES GOALS OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN

JN152111 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 15 Aug 81

[Excerpts] Damascus--The people's assembly held a meeting at 1800 this evening under speaker Mahmud Hadid in the presence of Prime Minister Dr 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm; Walid Hamdun, deputy prime minister for services affairs; and the ministers.

Dr 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm delivered a speech on the state's 5-year development plan, its aspects and objectives. He stressed that development requires great efforts, characterized by firm will, scientific research, patience, accuracy of administration and proper implementation of all its aspects. The prime minister added that the limited sources should be wisely used and that both public and private expenditure should be economically justified.

Dr al-Kasm summarized the objectives of economic and social development as: increasing domestic production by 8.5 percent per year; increasing the GNP by 7.6 percent per year; increasing the employment by 4.2 percent per year; raising rates of investment by 6.7 percent; increasing total consumption; and increasing imports, exports and savings.

He also summarized the objectives of the state budget as: balancing domestic resources with expenditures in the general budget; balancing the general budget itself and the GDP; increasing current resources and revenues; limiting general administrative expenditures; reducing the deficit in the general state budget; and reducing the domestic resources deficit in the balance of payments.

In conclusion, Prime Minister Dr al-Kasm extended thanks to all those who had participated in preparing the draft of the development plan. He expressed his faith and truth that everyone would exert increasing efforts to overcome any difficulty in order to ensure the success of the fifth development plan and, accordingly, the success of economic and social development which is a great national task.

CSO: 4304/115

UGTT LEADER DISCUSSES FUTURE PLANS, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 23 Jul 81 p 5

[Interview with Taieb Baccouche, UGTT Executive Committee Member, by Lucien Ahonto and Mireille Lemaquesquier; date and place not given]

[Text] It may seem somewhat surprising initially that we are including the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT), the only (at least for the time being) Tunisian trade union, in this survey of political movements in opposition to the sole political party. But it is much less surprising after learning the role which this federation has played in the long process of liberalization. In the opinion of many observers, the events that followed the strike order issued in January 1978 by the UGTT, led by Mr Habib Achour at that time, were a decisive factor in convincing the authorities that democratization was necessary. More generally, it is a certainty that as a result of learning to retain a certain part of its individuality despite its structural ties with the sole party, the UGTT today appears to be the only mass organization capable of mobilizing a good percentage of Tunisian workers. The trade union federation founded by Ferhat Hached could therefore logically be tempted to participate in the current political debate more explicitly, but perhaps not directly--that seems difficult--but more securely through an alliance with one of the parties (leftist, no doubt) that have applied for recognition. That would be the only thing that could change the present situation, which seems to favor reactionary movements.

LE CONTINENT: What are the UGTT's current relations with the Destourian Socialist Party?

Taieb Baccouche: Our relations with the party in power are based on the government's respect for the UGTT's independence. Past experience has clearly shown that any interference with the federation's internal affairs can have serious consequences for the country.

We also believe that dialogue with the government, a candid and responsible dialogue, remains the basis for solving the various problems facing the country.

For the time being, our relations are therefore normal relations between a trade union and a government trying to find a basis of understanding within the context of dialogue.

LE CONTINENT: Is this the result of the Gafsa congress?

Taieb Baccouche: The last UGTT congress can rightly be considered a turning point. In fact, if we disregard the congresses that were held from 1946 to 1956, when independence was declared, it can be said that UGTT congresses have most often been characterized by some form of government intervention since independence. For almost a quarter-century, therefore, the UGTT has always been faced with the problem of trade union autonomy and problems resulting from a certain amount of intervention in union affairs by the government in general and by certain factions within the government in particular. Most of the UGTT's crises since that time have mainly been due to such problems.

LE CONTINENT: Will the UGTT take part in the next parliamentary elections?

Taieb Baccouche: With regard to the UGTT's possible participation in the parliamentary elections, the new Executive Committee has been ordered to study the matter in depth and to present its findings at the next meeting of the federation's National Council in November.* It is therefore too early to decide on a position.

Participation Procedures

LE CONTINENT: Is it one of the functions of a trade union to submit lists of candidates for election and, furthermore, is it desirable for the UGTT to engage in political activity?

Taieb Baccouche: The UGTT cannot be expected to behave like a political party. But that does not mean that it must remain indifferent to what is happening in the national political arena. On the contrary, it plays an active part in national political life. Methods and procedures must now be defined. For the present, it is still too early to provide any specific information about all that, in view of the change in relations between the UGTT and the government.

One thing is certain, however: we have no intention of setting the UGTT up as a political party or of forming a party. As for the possible participation of UGTT members in the next elections, I cannot tell you the party tickets on which they would run. That is also part of what I call the "participation procedures," which must be defined by the National Council.

LE CONTINENT: Concerning the UGTT itself, what impact could its greater independence have on national political life?

Taieb Baccouche: Establishing trade union independence and the exercise of democracy within the federation is likely to also favor the development of a more democratic national life, since the problems are related. The UGTT is not acting like a political party and I don't believe that it will behave as such; but it is obvious that as an important union organization, the UGTT takes part in national political life, also participates in working out development plans, in defining social and economic choices and, by that very fact, thus participates in political life in

*Since this interview took place before the date of the elections was set, for 1 November, the National Council could meet before November.

the broadest sense of the term. Considering all of this, the UGTT can effectively contribute to the development of a more democratic national life, which can be given concrete form through the establishment of political pluralism.

LE CONTINENT: Isn't there the risk of a split within the UGTT? There was much talk of this at the time of the Gafsa congress, because there was definitely a split over the approach to be adopted concerning the case of Mr Habib Achour. Are these unfounded rumors?

Taieb Baccouche: I believe that there is no risk of a split. These are unfounded rumors. The withdrawal of about 23 percent of our comrades, or 127 delegates, was a withdrawal of principle for some, since they believed that the issue would be sidestepped at the congress. If they had participated in discussing this issue, they would not have withdrawn. That is why most of those comrades, after seeing the results of the congress both in terms of resolutions and the new Executive Committee's composition, regretted their withdrawal and would have liked to have had the honor of participating in making such resolutions.

One Stage in the Struggle

LE CONTINENT: Then this was a misunderstanding?

Taieb Baccouche: Essentially a misunderstanding, since there is no difference in principles; of course, there are differences in working methods. For most congress participants, the congress was just one stage in the struggle.

LE CONTINENT: What are the priorities of action which you are setting for your union, now that you have returned to normal union life?

Taieb Baccouche: First of all, this year is an extremely important year for us, since every deadline is coming up at the same time, political, social and economic deadlines.

Priority is being given to reviving all collective negotiations and bylaws this year; that is a huge undertaking. It therefore requires effective preparation. Secondly, the Sixth 5-Year Plan must be prepared. It is the UGTT's duty to issue opinions on such projects, so that this plan will be in the interest of the working class and underprivileged classes. We also plan to take vigorous action to limit social and regional disparities as much as possible while fighting for greater social justice.

The wage-price spiral must be broken. Thus the rise of wages between March and April did not cause prices to flare up. Dialogue with the government may lead to positive results. In fact, it is basically a question of improving the standard of living without causing an increase in the cost of living. We will thus make progress toward social justice.

A Maghrebien Dimension

The political and trade union situation in Tunisia is not developing in an isolated environment, but in a natural regional context whose penetrability has often been demonstrated by history.

Under these circumstances, we might wonder whether the changes in the UGTT's bylaws will affect other trade unions in the Maghreb.

Although still exercising discretion, the general secretary of the Tunisian trade union federation recalled that the UGTT's founder, Mr Ferhat Hasched, always gave a Maghrebian dimension to his actions: "It is very difficult to talk about trade union life in other countries, but I believe that one effect of the historic ties which have existed between the UGTT since its inception and Maghrebian trade union movements, in particular in Algeria and Morocco, but also Libya and Mauritania, is that what happens in one Maghreb country does not go unnoticed and most often has a definite impact on the trade union situation in other countries, in view of such historic ties. As for us, we intend to revive a certain kind of union unity on a Maghrebian scale and to return more or less to the sources of Maghrebian trade unionism, because Tunisian trade unionism, since the birth of the UGTT in 1946, actually had a Maghrebian orientation. The UGTT's founder, in everything he did, always gave a Maghrebian dimension to his union activity. And we are also determined to give this Maghrebian dimension to our actions."

Achour to Be Pardoned Soon?

"President Bourguiba gave me to understand that on 3 August, on the occasion of the birthday of the chief of state, Mr Habib Achour could be released. His problem should no longer be stated in political terms, but in human terms," Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed M'Zali said on 14 July during a long interview graded to UPI.

If Mr Achour's release should actually take place, Mr Baccouche believes that it would undoubtedly be the result of various action taken since the Gafsa congress by the UGTT on behalf of Mr Achour. "The congress unanimously passed a motion on the 'ostracism' of Comrade Habib Achour. This motion states in particular that we attach a great deal of importance to a general pardon and to measures to expunge the offense, not merely its consequences.

"We are determined to continue the fight so that measures to 'ostracize' Comrade Achour--he is the only one left--will be suspended. We took advantage of the first meeting with the president of the republic to raise the issue, but since we saw him on the day after the congress, we did not yet have all our motions ready and we therefore did not discuss the matter in depth. We raised the issue with the prime minister during the first official interview which he granted us and discussed the matter. We hope that through persuasion and dialogue, we will manage to give concrete form to the recommendations of the congress and the special motion on the 'ostracism.'"

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TUNISIA

POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS DISCUSS MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 220, 20-26 Jul 81

[20-26 Jul 81 pp 24-25]

[Text] The Temporary Committee of the People's Unity Movement [MUP] maintains that the legitimate existence of any movement is not contingent on the number of votes it gets.

The draft National Charter which has been approved by the Tunisian government--that charter in which the Destourian party set forth its conditions for accepting the appearance of opposition movements--has stirred the objections of the parties. In the past two issues of AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI the Political Bureau of the People's Unity Movement, the Tunisian Communist party, the Islamic Movement [also known as Movement Tendance Islamique MTI, the Movement of Socialist Democrats and the Tunisian General Union of Labor [UGTT] made their observations. The observations of the temporary committee of the People's Unity Movement and the Progressive Muslims are here [in this issue].

Early this year observers in Tunisia were taken by surprise when a news report issued by the official news agency announced that President Bourguiba had met with four figures who were known for their affiliation with the People's Unity Movement. The four figures had been placed on trial along with the members of the movement in June 1977. At that time Mohamed Belhadj Omar had called a press conference on behalf of the group to announce a split within the People's Unity Movement and the fact that a few of the well-known inner [circle of] leaders would have nothing to do with the movement's secretary general, Ahmed Ben Salah.

This new movement then filed an application for a permit so it can exist as a public political party and publish a newspaper that would speak for it. A short time afterwards the minister of the interior summoned two members of this movement and informed them that the government had decided to permit their party to publish a political newspaper. The temporary committee of the People's Unity Movement thus becomes the second movement after the Democrats' Movement to be allowed to publish a newspaper.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI met with Mohamed Belhadj Omar and asked him about the questions of the conflict his group has with the Political Bureau of the People's Unity Movement. We asked him about where the movement he represents stood on the current situation.

[Question] Why was there a split in the People's Unity Movement?

[Answer] What did in fact happen was not a split in the heart of the movement, but it was a correction of a deviation and a return to the original principles on whose bases the movement had been created. This happened after those whom we call the "Ben Salahite" faction moved away from the movement. Those people are personally loyal to Ahmed Ben Salah, and they wanted to turn the movement into a mere pressure group whose only objective was to return to power opposite a second movement which we represent. This is the People's Unity Movement which wanted to make the movement an independent popular movement that would interact with the toiling masses and whose purpose was to build a socialist society. This fundamental difference between the two movements became evident, especially since the trial to which the movement was subjected in June 1977. This difference manifested itself in the disparate sentences that were rendered against the individuals of both movements. Then the conflicts and the mutual contradictions became sharper while the First National Conference was in session in July 1980 and afterwards. This forced some of the fighters, despite their unceasing efforts to safeguard the movement's unity, to submit their resignations from [their positions of] responsibility and call for starting a serious and profound dialogue around some of the actions and positions of individuals.

It was natural for this difference to show up one day in the life of the movement because ever since it was formed, this movement had included in its ranks groups of fighters who belong to various social and professional circles and generations who were joined together by an agreement in principle that is based on what was mentioned in the statement that was published by the movement in 1975, and especially the following principles:

A. Practicing genuine democratic action in the innermost circles of the movement by relying on continuous and comprehensive self-criticism for every action; repudiating unilateral action; and rejecting the narrow notion of leadership so we can spare our movement [the danger] of making serious mistakes.

B. Working to ensure the independence of the movement in all the choices and decisions it makes and establishing the principle of non-affiliation with any movement inside or outside the country.

C. Staying in step with the people's struggles and with their legitimate aspirations for freedom, democracy and social justice; and strengthening the popular organizations, especially labor and student organizations.

Despite the fact that everybody endorsed these basic principles, the second movement has been trying to violate them ever since the recent National Conference was convened.

[Question] What is the program that your movement is defending?

[Answer] We believe that the liberal policy which has been followed for the past years has led to the creation of a new bourgeois class on the economic and social scenes. This class tied its interests closely with those of foreign monopolistic capital, and this established subordination and strengthened the hegemony of the new colonialism over the country. It sharpened the differences between a fortunate minority, which is protected by the regime, and the vast majority of the people who continue to suffer from high prices, from increasingly serious speculations and from the spread of unemployment.

This policy has also aggravated the imbalance between agencies on the one hand and cities and villages on the other. This imbalance exists equally in the distribution of basic furnishings and in industrial or agricultural projects as well.

In the educational and cultural field the liberal choices that were based on class and selectivity aggravated [the problem of] the disruption of education and expulsion from school among the ranks of the people. This made them victims of illiteracy and vagrancy. It dimmed their prospects and caused uncertainty about the future in the ranks of young people. [It also caused] a blatant incongruity between educational programs and employment requirements, and this further aggravated unemployment and migration from rural areas.

Furthermore, the prevailing fluctuation in the cultural policy which is being followed by the regime has distorted authentic Islamic Arab values by adopting imported educational and cultural models.

[Question] What is your alternative?

[Answer] The People's Unity Movement which has not stopped criticizing the danger of this policy is proposing an alternative that is based on a socialist choice made in the context of honoring socialist and public liberties. Our view of the road that must be followed to build a socialist society can only stem from the popular masses. This means that our view stipulates the actual participation of the forces of production in the decision making [process] and in supervision on all levels. Because we set out from a profound and an objective analysis of the contradictions that our society is experiencing, all our energies are being directed towards overcoming these contradictions for the purpose of creating new economic and social relations that would ensure the establishment of genuine social justice.

The achievement of these objectives can only be realized--and we have not stopped affirming this--by honoring socialist and public liberties which are not only confined to traditional liberties such as the freedom of speech, the freedom to organize and to assemble and the freedom of religion. In fact, we have not stopped affirming that these liberties will

remain superficial unless they gain not only legislative guarantees but also economic guarantees as well.

It is the view of the People's Unity Movement that these liberties will not become truly democratic until all citizens, especially the toiling classes, can practice them. This requires that new choices be available to guarantee that these liberties will be practiced in economic, social, educational and cultural areas on the basis of the right to establish alternatives, the right to make a decision and the right to supervise and to monitor.

On the basis of these principles our 1975 statement set forth our general trends and the program of our activities in all the sectors. We are pointing out that this program--since we asked for a legal permit--is now under consideration by committees which we formed from among our fighters so as to keep the program in step with events.

[Question] Will your movement take part in the coming parliamentary elections?

[Answer] It is premature to raise the question of our movement's participation in the coming elections which are being proposed by the regime as a new stage in the context of the open-door policy. However, the movement is urgently affirming that there are basic conditions for organizing a truly democratic elections campaign. Among those conditions we mention the need to clear the political climate by issuing a general legislative amnesty and repealing all unconstitutional laws and decrees.

We do not consider legislative elections an end in themselves or a blessing from the regime. These elections rather constitute a serious and a responsible political action, considering the fact that the elections make it possible to mobilize all the political movements equally so as to conduct a popular referendum on specific political and economic programs.

Until today, however, consultations with the political movements on this objective have not taken place. The People's Unity Movement does not think that the legitimate existence of any political movement should be contingent on the number of votes it gets in elections that are held under mysterious circumstances.

[Question] What is your position on the draft National Charter?

[Answer] Our movement has always called for a comprehensive national dialogue in which all political movements and popular organizations that are represented would take part. This dialogue must deal with the conditions that would push our country on to the road of democratic and socialist change, and especially those conditions of honoring the constitution and the republican regime, safeguarding national independence and the gains of the people, honoring public liberties, repudiating all forms of violence regardless of their origin, achieving social justice and affirming the Islamic Arab personality.

[Question] Will you participate in the proposed "National Conference" of political leaders if such a conference is convened?

[Answer] We believe that an opposition front has to be built on a progressive basis and, above all else, on the basis of programs. It is not to be an opposition front merely for the sake of opposition. All opposition movements must commit themselves to struggle for the purpose of adopting a policy whose substance is socialist and whose methods are democratic. Nationalist and progressive forces are to work together for the purpose of confronting every danger that would result from the pursuit of a non-popular policy; they must continue to be vigilant and commit themselves totally to respond to the masses' real preoccupations.

[20-26 July 81 pp 25-26]

[Text] Progressive Muslims: multiple parties are and objective fact, and the regime's recognition of that fact is an observation of reality.

The great expansion that the Islamic movement has experienced in Tunisia attracted supporters with various affiliations. This led to the appearance of differences within the movement that in many instances ended in the occurrence of divisions. Among these divisions was the split effected by the group of Attorney Hasan al-Ghadbani. That group established a party which they called the Consultative Islamic party.

Among the groups that grew out of the original Islamic faction also was the movement of Progressive Muslims. One of its prominent figures is Hamidah al-Nayfar, editor in chief of the magazine, AL-MA'RIFAH, the faction's magazine, which he had left in 1978. Another one of the faction's known figures is Salah al-Jurshi who was one of the magazine's chief editors.

The correspondent of AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI met with al-Nayfar and with al-Jurshi and asked them about the underlying assumptions of their faction and its ideological and political goals.

[Question] How did your dispute with the other Islamic faction evolve into a breach in relations?

[Answer] Some of us were active within the other faction, and we became convinced that a cultural revolution in the Islamic world would have to be effected because a large measure of our inferiority and our backwardness is attributable to the fact that we do not understand our history and we do not understand the Koran and the developments that took place in recent times. Unless this objective analysis takes place, the Islamic world will continue to flounder in backwardness. Hence, one of our first objectives is to rebuild religious thought.

One may ask why this question is urgent, and the answer would be that in our view the experiences of the 100 or 50 years of resurgence have proven that religion cannot be ignored and left for public consumption while

political matters are taken over by people with a capitalist, western background. As a result of this fact the religious social structure continued to function despite the official [line of] talk which stated that it had to be left alone. This structure continued to function on the social and cultural level, and many of the movements that have been hoping for change paid no attention to it despite the fact that it affects people's beliefs, such as their belief in miracles, and endorses an inferior notion of society.

Opposite those people others emerged calling for the reformulation of cultural structures in the old style of the al-Salafiyah [an Islamic reform movement] school. This attitude is represented by Islamic religious factions in the Arab and Islamic world which believe that the best way for restoring Islamic cultural structures is to reformulate them in the old style. For this reason we unabashedly call them proponents of the past.

It is our view that there is a significant factor manifesting itself in the cultural structure which is still influential. What is happening in Iran, Algeria and Tunisia confirms its existence. This is what we call the Islamic pulse which cannot be ignored nor restored by the method of the al-Salafiyah school. We think that in order to formulate a new and a revolutionary society, the underlying assumptions [of the situation] we find ourselves in must be considered as well as what humanity has added to them over these centuries. We can thus restore our pulse to suit the times in which we are living and not some other time. It is therefore not possible to talk about Islamic action in Tunisia without taking into consideration the developments that are taking place in Tunisia itself. We are not in Egypt; we are not in Iran; nor are we in 1981. We are in Tunisia today, Tunisia which has experienced resistance to colonialism and the emergence of new aspirations. From this perspective we consider ourselves progressive. We also understand the influences that are coming to us from east and west Europe. This is because the geo-political situation has an effect which must be taken into consideration. One of the meanings of progressiveness also is that modern conviction in Islam today can only come about by taking into consideration the period that extends from 1956 until today.

There is also another difference that may draw the line between our ideas and those of others. This difference lies in our view that Islam does not color the understanding with one hue only. Islam comprises the uncontested portions of the Koran, that is, [those verses] that are clear and specific; and it also comprises verses that are obscure and not clearly intelligible. These may be interpreted variously. Therefore, there is no dogmatism in Islam. Islam has a philosophic immutable view of a person because that view is one of its fundamental questions. That is, it comes from the uncontested portions of the Koran.

There is also the relationship between one person and another or what is called public morality. It [too] is constant and immutable. Other than these two aspects, the philosophical aspect and that of worship and morality, the remaining questions, such as those of the regime, of social functions, and of the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the

governed, are questions that do not have the quality of constancy. Accordingly, the social and political aspect is determined by every society according to its conditions and in the light of Islam's public laws. In the context of defining this mutable and developing aspect of Islam, one may take advantage of what other human societies have achieved, even those that are not Islamic.

There is another point of dispute, which is the position on the Muslims' heritage. Although the works of our scholars have produced a plentiful heritage, not all of this heritage is necessarily true. Inasmuch as we maintain an open mind towards the outside world, we maintain an open mind also towards our heritage by abandoning [our tendency to] view it in glorified terms. Hence we are proposing the need to renew religious thought in the light of major Islamic principles and over-all human production, whether that production comes from the east or from the west.

[Question] How did your movement evolve into an independent movement?

[Answer] We have had Islamic activity in Tunisia since 1970. This activity manifested itself in giving lessons and publishing the magazine, AL-MA'RIFAH. But this Islamic activity was didactic, and its political background consisted of considering the existing regime responsible for the looseness of morals. Therefore, Islamic action was very traditional, especially since the Islamic movement itself considered itself at that time a means for salvation and sensed that it had a heroic role in saving society. Hence developed one of the points of the dispute between us.

The dispute was set off ever since 1975, and the first problem was what we called "the Tunisization of Islamic action." We had not been looking at the experience of Egypt, Sudan or any of the other countries; but we were rather looking at our own situation, and we were emphasizing the need to analyze it and to proceed from it. This led to the existence of two different views on whose bases the dispute widened until it ended with my departure from the magazine, AL-MA'RIFAH, where I was editor in chief. I left the magazine because of the dispute we had around these questions and around the position on human thought. The dispute began when our work developed in the seventies, and the nucleus [of our movement] was expanded with a gathering of support among students, professors, physicians and others. These groups had had social experiences that we ought to have understood and gone along with. We may hence summarize the questions of the dispute in three points: first, the attempt to free ourselves from the "moral" view of people and society, [an approach] that explains everything in moral terms; second, the departure from simplification and generalization, especially the position on the questions regarding which we used to express public positions such as those of social justice and the freedom of women in Islam; and third, the establishment of interaction between us and the society from which we had been semi-alienated. The truth is that it was the thinking of al-Sayyid Qutb which crystallized this alienation. Qutb articulated his thoughts in three statements. They are: the ignorance of the society in which we live; looking down on that society under the pretext that it was not ours; and dissociation, that is, there had to be total

alienation from the society. Qutb offered no solution to the proposed problems because he considered them to be the result of ignorance. These three components make up one of the aspects of the al-Salafiyah mentality. Then the dispute developed after we had made significant progress in our attempt to read the heritage and evaluate the reality that we were experiencing. It became evident to us that the moral factor was merely the outcome and not the source of all of society's problems. We also considered popularization to be the bane of various societies because it legitimized everything. A discussion about social justice, for example, is quite meaningless unless we tie it with the question of ownership and changing production relationships.

The case is the same in the question of the political regime. We are not calling for absolute democracy; we rather define democracy in terms of establishing and honoring constitutional institutions, preserving the separation of the powers and making the public participate so they can become spokesmen for these institutions and can speak on their behalf.

[Question] Where do you stand on the multi-party political system?

[Answer] The multi-party system is an objective fact, and the regime did no more than recognize this fact. The university, for example, which graduates most of the generations and cadres of the future have students who rally around factions and movements that aspire for change. This phenomenon is growing and is influencing other sectors because those people graduate and become influential members of society. The university is graduating new generations and groups whose aspirations and positions cannot be ignored. The multi-party system then has forced itself on reality because Tunisia in 1981 is not the same as Tunisia in 1956 or in 1934. Consequently, the regime's recognition of the multi-party system is a mere observation of reality.

The question that is being raised now is a question on the nature of the step that is to follow this recognition. This is a more difficult step because it sets problems in front of the regime which the regime cannot solve, such as the problem of developing the country's institutions, the agencies of the media and the ministries that formulate the major choices. These institutions are not the property of a group, but they rather belong to all the people, and, accordingly, the matter requires total reconstruction.

The average citizen finds strange contradictions in the stage through which we are now passing. There is, for example, the discussion about multiple parties which is taking place at a time when illegal practices are continuing, such as sudden arrest, the closing down of some newspapers and the refusal to grant legal permits to other newspapers. In view of this situation we want popular resolutions not resolutions that come from above, because true democracy does not wait for resolutions that come from above.

[Question] Did you ask for permission to publish a newspaper that would speak for you, or did you ask for a permit for a political party?

[Answer] We think there is a primary need which manifests itself in crystallizing our own inner thoughts, that is, among ourselves and also with others at the same time. Therefore, we feel the need for establishing a dialogue and the need for having a public bulletin that would articulate our convictions. To hear the opinions of others and to give shape to this inclination we filed an application in the summer of 1980 to publish an intellectual monthly magazine that would deal with social issues in a scholarly analytic fashion. At the outset the authorities appeared prepared to approve our request, but they did not follow through with any practical measure. Likewise, we will soon submit an application to obtain a permit to establish a cultural society that would hold lectures and seminars and publish a cultural publication about them.

[Question] Don't you think that this concentration on cultural activity makes you merely an intellectual movement and keeps you from appearing to be a political movement?

[Answer] Every political movement has an intellectual starting point and an ideological background. This is what is fundamental in our view. We have general principles which we want to crystallize. Therefore, the existence of a cultural society is necessary. Let us take, for example, the French socialist party which did not represent anything major 2 decades ago. But because of the struggle upon which its fighters and leaders embarked, it has come to represent a force whose intellectual and political proportions are rooted in French society. Hence emerges the need to base every serious movement on an intellectual foundation and on profound programs so that these can give the movement's politics an integrated cultural and ideological dimension that develops with reality. What is being proposed to the progressive Muslims, therefore, is the establishment of a distinctive ideology. We believe that entering the political arena is not difficult, but staying in it is difficult indeed because that requires strong underlying principles.

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